Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 26 | Issue 3

5-1-1951

Notes
R. Emmett Fitzgerald
Joseph C. Spalding
Bernard James McGraw
Robert A. Stewart

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
R. E. Fitzgerald, Joseph C. Spalding, Bernard J. McGraw & Robert A. Stewart, Notes, 26 Notre Dame L. Rev. 476 (1951).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol26/iss3/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Article 4

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

NOTES
Banks and Banking
ABILITY OF BANKS TO LImIT LIABILITY BY CONTRACT

In an effort to limit the heavy responsibility which the common
law imposes upon them, banking institutions frequently resort to exculpatory clauses in contracts with their customers. These clauses are
found in stop-payment orders, and in contracts for the use of safe
deposit boxes and night depositories. Banks are under a common law
duty to honor stop-payment orders,' but safe deposit boxes and night
depositories are extended services over and above the general business
of banking, and do not subject banks to strict liability. It has been
the contention of the banks, that in rendering these latter services,
they should be allowed to protect themselves by contract because of
the unique character of the relationship, and the lack of knowledge
by the bank of the value of the deposit. The validity of these clauses
has been attacked on the grounds of public policy, and as being contrary to accepted principles of the law of contracts and bailments.
No general rule can be applied to all three situations since the validity
of the clause depends on the relationship which the bank assumesdebtor, bailee or lessor.
I.
Stop-Payment Orders
The rule is settled that the drawer of an uncertified check may
revoke his order to pay at any time prior to the payment of the check
by the bank. The bank is bound by the revocation and after receiving
notice it pays at its peril.2 Banks have sought to limit this liability
in one of two ways: by inserting an exculpatory clause in the passbook, by which the clause becomes a part of the deposit contract,3 or
in the stop-payment notice form. 4 At common law a bank owed a duty
to its depositors to act in good faith and with reasonable care in its
regular banking relations with them. The exculpatory clauses attempt
to limit the liability of the bank for negligence and inadvertence; if
the clause is held valid, banks are liable only for a wilful disregard
of the notice.5
1
2

Shude v. American State Bank, 263 Mich. 519, 248 N. W. 886 (1933).
5 MicEaE, BANxS AND BANrNG § 193 (Perm. ed. 1932); 34 VA. L. REv.
834 (1948).
3 34 MNm. L. REV. 330 (1950); 33 MINw. L. R~v. 179 (1949).
4 Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 Pac. 947 (1926);
Calamita v. Tradesmefi National Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A. (2d) 46 (1949);
Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N. E. 488 (1932); Gaita v.
Windsor Bank, 251 N. Y. 152, 167 N. E. 203 (1929).
5 Gaita v. Windsor Bank, supra note 4.
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Courts of different jurisdictions, 6 and even courts of the same jurisdiction,7 have viewed these clauses in different lights. A slight majority
have upheld their validity on the broad tenet of freedom of contract.8
The courts declaring them invalid have attacked them on the ground
of lack of consideration, or as contrary to public policy.9 The reasoning in support of both validity and invalidity appears strong and
convincing.
Some courts make no mention of consideration 10 while others find
it where apparently there is none."1 Courts which hold the exculpatory
clauses invalid because of a lack of consideration have drawn a distinction between insertion of the clause in the passbook and insertion
in the stop-payment order itself. If contained in the passbook it
becomes a part of the original deposit contract, and it is well established that there is consideration in that situation. 12 When the clause
appears on the stop-payment notice, there is debate as to whether there
is adequate consideration to support it.13 It has been held that where
the bank suffers no detriment and the depositor gains no benefit the
clause is void for lack of consideration. 14 In Calamita v. Tradesmen
National Bank, 15 counsel for the bank contended that the bank had
a right to terminate its relationship with the depositor at any time,
and that continuance of the relationship constituted consideration for
6 Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 Pac. 947 (1926); Calamita v. Tradesmen National Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A. (2d) 46 (1949); Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N. E. 488 (1932); Tremont
Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N. E. 782 (1920); Speroff v. FirstCentral Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N. E. (2d) 119 (1948).
7 Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 251 N. Y. 152, 167 N. E. 203 (1929), overruling
Levine v. Bank of United States, 132 Misc. 130, 229 N. Y. Supp. 108 (Mun. Ct.
of N. Y. C. 1928); Speroff v. First-Central Trust Co., supra note 6, overruling
John H. Mahon v. Huntington Nat. Bank of Columbus, 62 Ohio App. 261, 23
N. E. (2d) 638 (1939).
8 Martinez v. National City Bank of New York, 80 F. Supp. 545 (D. Puerto
Rico 1948); Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N. E. 488
(1932); Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N. E. 782 (1920);
Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 251 N. Y. 152, 167 N. E. 203 (1929).
9 Calamita v. Tradesmen National Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A. (2d) 46
(1949); Speroff v. First-Central Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N. E. (2d)
119 (1948); Notes, Invalidity of Clause Limiting Bank's Liability for Failure to
Obey, 44 ILL. L. Rnv. 530, 531 (1949); Effect of Stipulations Relieving Banks
from Liability for Failure to Comply with Stop-Payment Orders, 28 NEs. L. Rv.
437,439 (1949).
10 Martinez v. National City Bank of New York, 80 F. Supp. 545 (D. Puerto
Rico 1948).
11 Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N. E. 488 (1932).
12 34 MsiwN. L. REv. 330 (1950).
13 Calamita v. Tradesmen National Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A. (2d) 46
(1949); Speroff V. First-Central Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N. E. (2d) 119
(1948).
14 See note 13 supra.
15 135 Conn. 326, 64 A. (2d) 46 (1949).
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the insertion of the clause in the stop-payment order. The court said
the argument might have been valid if the bank had expressed a desire
to terminate the relationship, but since it had not, there was no consideration; there must be an actual bargaining for the continuation
of the relationship in return for the insertion of the exculpatory clause.
Judicial attacks upon exculpatory clauses proceeding upon the
ground of public interest have been hampered by the lack of a clear
line of demarcation between sound and unsound public policy. In
Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., it was said: 16
Whether or not a contract is against public policy is a question of
law for the court to determine from all the circumstances in the particular case. . . . Agreements are not to be held void as against public
policy, unless they are clearly contrary to what the Constitution, the
Legislature or the judiciary have declared to be public policy, or unless
they clearly tend to the injury of the public in some way.

Among the circumstances affecting the decision of the courts are: the
wording of the clause itself, the intention of the parties, the location
of the clause, the balance of bargaining power, and the social and economic benefits or detriments resulting from the use and enforcement of
the clause.
Several forms of stop-payment notices reduce the "order" to a mere
wish or hope: "the undersigned hereby requests,"'17 "please endeavor
to stop payment on my check," 18 "the undersigned makes the foregoing request as an act of courtesy only," 19 "please stop payment
on Check No. 220," 20 and the like. It should be borne in mind that
in each of the foregoing the depositor had the intention to stop payment. It can hardly be assumed that the depositor intended to employ
precatory terms to qualify the order when he had the absolute right
to stop payment. Were not these notices actually meant to be unqualified to which the bank annexed the clause in an effort to escape
a duty which it already owed the depositor? 21 Are not these clauses
mere snares for the unexperienced or uninformed depositor who does
not know his common law rights or the legal significance of the clauses?
The courts must answer these questions in deciding if the clauses are
in accord with sound public policy.
Some courts have been reluctant to uphold the exculpatory clause
when it appears in the passbook, placing it in the category of "traps
for the unwary," analogous to special conditions or limitations printed
16
17
(1949).
18
19
20
21

(1949).

96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N. E. 488,491 (1932).
Calamita v. Tradesmen National Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A. (2d) 46
Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind.App. 342, 183 N. E. 488 (1932).
Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 Pac. 947 (1926).
Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 251 N. Y. 152, 167 N. E. 203 (1929).
Calamita v. Tradesmen National Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A. (2d)

46

NOTES
Inv. Co. v.
unnoticed on the back of railroad tickets. In Los Angeles
22
Home Savings Bank of Los Angeles, the court said:
In order for the bank to avail itself of the statement [in the passbook]
as a contract made by the plaintiff, it was necessary for the bank to prove
that the statement had been called to the attention of some responsible
officer of the company. Without this it cannot be fairly said that it was
accepted or consented to by the company.

Inequality of bargaining power is another argument advanced for
invalidity. This contention possibly is weakened if the depositor need
not do business with the bank in the first place. If he could transfer
his account to another bank, in the course of time, competition would
resolve the difficulty. However, when one bank in a district employs
the clause the rest of the banks usually follow the same practice, and
the depositor must deal with one of them. Also, the bank may be
the only one in a small community or rural area. Consequently, the
bank usually possesses superior bargaining power. There is always
the argument that ff the bank refuses to stop payment unqualifiedly
the depositor may cancel his account and terminate the relationship
in order to protect himself.23 But regarding the bank as an entrepreneur, should it be allowed to exonerate itself from performing the
acts it is paid to perform?
The typical exculpatory clause in a stop-payment order recites:
"Should this check be paid through inadvertence, accident or oversight, it is expressly agreed that the bank will in no way be held responsible." 24 These clauses have been held to include every act of
the bank except wilful disregard of the notice. Originally, it was
settled that a bank could not limit its liability by contract to avoid
25
the consequences of negligence, but cases holding exculpatory clauses
to
this general rule.
contrary
valid are ostensibly
The most recent cases on the subject hold the exculpatory clause
26
a clause was held
invalid. In Speroff v. First-Central Trust Co.,
void for lack of consideration and as being contrary to public policy.
27
In Calamita v. Tradesmen National Bank, the court held it invalid
for lack of consideration without deciding the public policy question.
Both cases pronounce strong arguments for the invalidity of the clauses
and may prove persuasive in those jurisdictions which have not yet
passed on the question.

180 Cal. 601, 182 Pac. 293, 298 (1919).
23 Gaita v.Windsor Bank, 251 N.Y. 152, 167 N. E. 203 (1929).
24 Calamita v. Tradesmen National Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A. (2d) 46
(1949); Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N. E. 488 (1932);
Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N. E. 782 (1920); Gaita v.
Windsor Bank, 251 N. Y. 152, 167 N. E. 203 (1929).
25 Levine v. Bank of United States, 132 Misc. 130, 229 N. Y. Supp. 108
(Mun. Ct. of N. Y. C. 1928).
26 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N. E. (2d) 119 (1948).
27 135 Conn. 326, 64 A. (2d) 46 (1949).
22
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At the present time, the number of jurisdictions holding the clauses
valid 2 8 slightly outnumber those jurisdictions holding them void. 29
Jurisdictions yet to pass on the issue will find respectable authority
on both sides. A definite trend is yet to be established although the
more recent cases hold the clauses void as unsupported by consideration, and as contrary to public policy. The much debated Uniform
Commercial Code proposes that no agreement should limit a bank's
obligation on written stop-payment orders.30 Whatever the solution,
the depositor should be protected and the bank allowed to make a fair
return on its investment. The law should not hamper expedient banking practices, but neither should banks be permitted to take advantage
of uninformed depositors.
II.
Safe Deposit Boxes
Exculpatory clauses in contracts for the lease of safe deposit boxes
have been litigated in relatively few instances. When courts are presented with controversies involving loss of valuables from safe deposit
boxes, they generally base their decisions on the law of bailments.
The pivotal point usually is either the burden of proof or the degree
of care required, the express terms of the exoneration clauses seldom
being in issue. But where the exculpatory clause is the basis of a defense, policy considerations occupy the attention of the courts, much
as they do in the cases involving stop-payment orders. 3 '
In most jurisdictions a safe deposit company is deemed a professional bailee,3 2 whether classified as ordinary bailee, 83 bailee for
hire,3 4 special bailee,3 5 or bailee for mutual benefit,86 and the public's
See note 7 supra.
Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 Pac. 947 (1926);
Calamita v. Tradesmen National Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A. (2d) 46 (1949);
Speroff v. First-Central Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N. E. (2d) 119 (1948).
30 UNIFORM CommEcIAL CoD § 4-103(1)(d) (Sept. 1950 revision).
31 Sporsem v. First Nat. Bank of Poulsbo, 133 Wash. 199, 233 Pac. 641
(1925).
28

29

32

(1949).
33

Saddler v. Nat. Bank of Bloomington, 403 Ill. 218, 85 N. E. (2d) 733

Bedford, State Treasurer v. Colorado National Bank of Denver, 104

Colo. 311, 91 P. (2d) 469 (1939); Takoma Park Bank v. Abbott, 179 Md. 249,
19 A. (2d) 169 (1941); Cohen v. Manufacturers Safe Deposit Co., 297 N. Y.
266, 78 N. E. (2d) 604 (1948); In re Thompson, 183 Misc. 168, 50 N. Y. S.

(2d) 614 (Surrogate Ct. 1944); Bank of California et al. v. City of Portland,
157 Ore. 203, 69 P. (2d) 273 (1937); Mitchell
ence, 136 Pa. Super. 467, 7 A. (2d) 513 (1939).
34 Hauck v. First Nat. Bank of Highland
(2d) 565 (1944); Schmidt v. Twin City State
652 (1940); Underhill v. United States Trust

(1922).
385

v. First National Bank of ConfluPark, 323 Ill. App. 300, 55 N. E.
Bank, 151 Kan. 667, 100 P. (2d)
Co., 195 Ky. 149, 241 S. W. 812

Blair v. Riley, 37 Ohio App. 513, 175 N. E. 210 (1930).

NOTES
interest in competent operation of safe deposit companies is recognized. 37 A few jurisdictions designate them landlords 38 or warehousemen. 39 By denominating a safe deposit company a professional
bailee, the courts recognize that any clause which attempts to excuse
negligence is detrimental to the .public interest. Professional bailees
who insert the exculpatory clauses in contracts are met by the underlying rule that a bailee may not contract away the consequences of
his own negligence.4 0 However, there is unanimity in holding that he
41
is not an insurer.
Where a safe deposit company is labeled a bailee, the burden of
proving negligence becomes an important element. Generally, a bailor
need merely prove delivery to the bailee, and the bailee's failure to
redeliver, to make out a prima facie case. 42 However, there is a distinction between the safe deposit bailment and the ordinary bailment.
In the usual.bailment, where the bailee knows the nature and approximate value of the property and exercises exclusive control over it,
no hardship is imposed by requiring him to disprove his negligence by
a preponderance of the evidence. But in safe deposit cases, where the
bailee does not know the precise nature of the property, it has been
43
suggested that the courts specify the relationship a quasi-bailment
and adopt a less stringent rule of evidence.
In jurisdictions characterizing the safe deposit company as a bailee,
the tendency of the courts is to fasten liability on the defendant
bailee on the theory that the contract should be construed most strongly
44
against it.
In Sporsem v. First National Bank of Poulsbo,4 5 the
suit was by a depositor to recover for valuables stolen from a safe
deposit box by burglars. The exculpatory clause recited that the bank:
36 Kramer v. Grand National Bank of St. Louis, 336 Mo. App. 1022, 81
S. W. (2d) 961 (1935); Moon v. First Nat. Bank of Benson, 287 Pa. 398, 135
At. 114 (1926).
37 See Note, The Significance of Comparative Bargaining Power in the
Law of Exculpation, 37 CoL. L. Ray. 248 (1937).
38 Tow v. Evans, 194 Ga. 160, 20 S. E. (2d) 922 (1942); Kohlsaat v. First
Nat. Bank of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 471, 33 N. W. (2d) 712 (1948).
39 New Jersey Title Guarantee and Trust Co. v. Rector et al., 76 N. J. Eq.
587, 75 At. 931 (1910).
40 Pilson v. Tip-Top Auto Co., 67 Ore. 528, 136 Pac. 642 (1913).
41 Hauck v. First Nat. Bank of Highland Park, 323 Ill.
App. 300, 55 N. E.
(2d) 565 (1944); Morgan v. Citizen's Bank of Spring Hope, 190 N. C. 209, 129
S. E. 585 (1925); Wilson v. Citizens Central Bank of Nelsonville, 56 Ohio App.
478, 11 N. E. (2d) 118 (1936).
42

Rosendahl v. Lemhi Valley Bank, 43 Idaho 273, 251 Pac. 293 (1926);

Schaefer v. Washington Safety Deposit Co., 281 I1.43, 117 N. E. 781 (1917).
43

VAN Zxra, ErmxNTrs or aH LAw

or

BAuEwm

AxD CARImurs § 196

(2d Ed. 1908).
44 Saddler v. National Bank of Bloomington, 403 I1. 218, 85 N. E. (2d)
733 (1949).
45 133 Wash. 199, 233 Pac. 641 (1925).
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• . . agrees to exercise the same diligence in the protection of said box
and its contents against loss by fire or burglary that it uses in the protection of its own property, but assumes no liability whatever for any loss
or damage that may occur.

The bank, relying on the contract, contended that evidence tending
to show negligence in not preventing the burglary was inadmissible.
The court ruled out this contention categorically stating that it was
against public policy to permit a bailee for hire to exempt himself
from liability for his own negligence.
In Schaefer v. Washington Safety Deposit Co., 4 6 the clause provided that the liability of the bank was limited to the exercise of
ordinary care in preventing unauthorized persons from opening the box.
The court stated that if the clause purported to excuse negligence in
any other respect, it would be ineffective as against public policy.
In McDonald v. Win. D. Perkins & Co., 47 the construction of an
exculpatory clause was not necessary to the decision, but the court
noted in dictum the inability of a safe deposit company to exempt
itself from the consequences of its negligence.
When a layman rents a safe deposit box, it is hardly conceivable
that he fully understands the legal consequences of the various clauses
contained in the contract. The necessity of mutual assent has been
the subject of legislation, 48 although the cases are silent on the point.
The courts apparently are content to use the all-inclusive term "public
policy" as the basis of their decisions. Likewise, the safe deposit cases
mention nothing of the question of comparative bargaining power,
seemingly an important element in the determination of the validity
49
of these clauses.
The New York courts, expressing the minority view, have said that
the effect of the clause is to be determined by an interpretation of the
wording of the contract, and in the absence of an express contract,
the law of bailments should control. 50
As a general rule it might be said that the validity of exculpatory
clauses depends on the relationship created by safe deposit contract.
281 Ill.
43, 117 N. E. 781 (1917).
133 Wash. 622, 234 Pac. 456 (1925).
48 Mo. Rxv. STAT. § 8117 (1939). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 819-1020 (1939)
recites: "The bank . . . shall receive such papers or other personal property,
and rent out such receptacles or safe deposit boxes, upon the terms or conditions prescribed by it, but such terms and conditions shall not be binding upon
the corporations or persons availing themselves of such service unless they receive notice thereof."
49 See Note, The Significance of Comparative Bargaining Power in the Law
of Exculpation, 37 CoL. L. Rxv. 248 (1937).
50 Coons v. First Nat. Bank of Philmont, 218 App. Div. 283, 218 N. Y.
Supp. 189 (3d Dep't 1926); Sagendorph v. First Nat. Bank of Philmont, 218
46

47

App. Div. 285, 218 N. Y. Supp. 191 (3d Dep't 1926).
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483

Confronted by the general rule that a bailee for hire cannot limit his
liability for negligence, many safe deposit companies stipulate in the
contract that the relationship is to be that of landlord and tenant.
This might be interpreted as a subtle exculpatory clause in itself, since
fewer restrictions are placed upon the relationship of landlord and
tenant who contractually seek to define their liabilities than upon that
of bailor and professional bailee. 51 If the safe deposit company is
successful in labeling the relationship as one of landlord and tenant,
then the major policy considerations which would normally invalidate
the clause are not applicable. There is no public interest to be served
in contracts between landlords and tenants while such an interest is
manifestly present in contracts with professional bailees. Contracts
of tenancy are considered to be of a private nature and the parties
are regarded as being in a position of comparative equality of bargaining power. 5 2 Nor is the safe deposit company, 'under the rules 'f
landlord and tenant law, saddled with the burden of disproving negligence.
The relationship of landlord and tenant in safe deposit leases, has
been recognized by judicial decision 53 and by statute." 4 Few statutes
go as far as the Texas enactment 5 5 which simply provides that the
relationship is to be governed by the law of landlord and tenant. This
statute also recites that the safe deposit lessee shall be deemed in
exclusive possession of the box and contents, effectively excluding any
application of the law of bailments. If safe deposit companies are
successful in getting such a statute passed, a correct interpretation of
the law of lessor and lessee would hold that exculpatory clauses should
not be voided as contrary to public policy.
The policy considerations which bar the right of warehousemen to
limit liability for their negligence are applicable, in large measure, to
safe deposit companies. A few states have expressly classified safe
51 See Kolt v. Cleveland Trust Co.. ....
Ohio App .....
, 93 N. E. (2d) 788,
791 (1950): "Contracts relieving the promisor from liability even for his negligence have been upheld on the broad grounds of freedom of contract guaranteed
by the federal and state constitutions. For example, as between landlord and
tenant, it has been held that the relationship is not a matter of public interest
but relates exclusively to the private affairs of the parties concerned and that
the two parties stand upon equal terms."
52 Kirshenbaum v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 258 N. Y. 489, 180
N. E. 245 (1932).
53 Tow v. Evans, 194 Ga. 160, 20 S. E. (2d) 922 (1942); Kohlsaat v. First
Nat. Bank of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 471, 33 N. W. (2d) 712 (1948).
54 OxuA. STAT. tit. 6, § 441 (Cum. Supp. 1949), provides: "Any landlord
in the business of Tenting safe deposit boxes may by contract limit its liability
and may make reasonable regulations for the conduct of the business. Such
regulations shall be reduced to writing and delivered to the tenant. Any limitations as to liability shall be in printing or writing of the same size and type as
the other provisions of the contract."
55 TEx. STAT., REV. Civ. art. 342-906 (1948).
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deposit companies as warehousemen, either by judicial decision 56 or
statute, 57 making all statutes and rules pertaining to warehousemen
equally applicable to safe deposit companies. A short survey of the
law concerning exculpatory clauses in relation to warehousemen serves
to point up most of the policy considerations which are involved in
safe deposit contracts.
To make an exculpatory clause a valid subsisting part of the warehouseman contract, there must be mutual assent. 58 It has been held
that the clause should be carefully scrutinized in the light of public
policy. 5 9 Add the proposition that a contract of lease should be construed most strongly against the safe deposit company, 60 and it is
reasonable to conclude that many of the exoneration clauses inserted
in safe deposit box leases will not be upheld unless they are brought
specifically to the, attention of the depositor. It is against the social
interest to permit professional bailees to limit their liability for negligence, 61 and since warehousemen are charged with a statutory duty
of due care, any contractual attempt to lessen that duty is also contrary to legislative policy. 62 In jurisdictions imposing the duties of
warehousemen on safe deposit companies, the courts would be consistent only by declaring the exculpatory clauses invalid.
Legislatures have not been silent concerning the right of safe deposit companies to limit their liability by contract. Several states have
expressly recognized the right in two principal classes of statutes. The
first type recognizes the right to limit liability by contract but sets an
amount below which the company may not excuse itself. The figure
is computed by multiplying the annual box rental by an arbitrary
number, usually either three hundred 63 or five hundred. 64 The second
type is a more general recognition of the right, usually reciting that
the relationship is to be based "upon such terms as may be agreed by
56 New Jersey Title Guarantee and Trust Co. v. Rector et al., 76 N. J. Eq.
587, 75 Atl. 931 (1910).
57 S. C. CODE § 7902 (1942), recites: "Every trust company doing a safe
deposit business . . . shall be deemed a warehouseman as to such property, and
all existing statutes and laws affecting warehousemen shall apply to such de-

posits. . . ." See also WAsH. REv.

STAT. ANN. § 469-3 (1944).

Smith's Transfer & Storage Co. v. Batigne, 34 A. (2d) 705 (Mun. Ct. D.
C. 1943); Colgin v. Security Storage & Van Co., 208 La. 173, 23 So. (2d) 36
58

(1945).
59

Voyt v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 169 Ore. 30, 119 P. (2d) 586

(1941).
60 Saddler v. National Bank of Bloomington, 403 Ill. 218, 85 N. E. (2d)
733 (1949).
61 Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Kerr, 204 Ark. 238, 161 S. W. (2d) 403
(1942).
62 French v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 118 Colo. 424, 195 P. (2d) 968
(1948).
63 IowA CODE § 528.65 (1946); NEB. RE. STAT. § 8-501 (1943).
64 MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS, art. 23, § 293 (1939).

NOTES
the parties." 65 Types of statutes to which reference has already been
made determines the right to limit liability by the law of landlord and
tenant 66 or by the statutory regulation of warehousemen. 67 The clear
and unmistakable language of all the statutes probably accounts for
the paucity of cases on the subject.
III.
Night Depositories
The Ohio Court of Appeals is found to be the only court which
expressly has passed on the validity of exculpatory clauses in contracts for the use of night depositories. 68 It held the contract valid
and not contrary to public policy.
As in safe deposit contracts, the power to contract away liability
in night depository agreements depends upon the nature of the relationship created and the liabilities that arise by legal implication from
that relationship. It has been held that the use of a night depository
gives rise to a bailment for mutual benefit, 69 regardless of whether or
not anything more is required of the customer to bring about the
debtor-creditor relationship. Night depository contracts are of two
classes: those which require the depositor to merely drop the sack in
the chute, 70 and those which require the depositor to redeem the sack
on the next banking day. 71 In the first type, the relationship of debtorcreditor automatically arises when the teller examines, counts and
accepts the money, and enters it as a general deposit.7 2 In the second,
the debtor-creditor relationship arises only when the customer personally
gives the money to the teller for entry as a general deposit. In both
situations, while the money sack remains in the night receptacle, the
relationship is one of bailment for mutual benefit since there has been
no unequivocal acceptance of the deposit by the bank.
65 MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 5-514 (1947); N. Y. BANKING LAWS § 96;
Omio GEN. CODE ANNw. § 710-110 (Supp. 1946); TENN. CODE ANN. § 3890 (Willians 1934). WASH. RBv. STAT. ANIt. § 469-5 (1944) is typical: "Whenever

any safe deposit company shall let or lease any vault . . . such safe deposit
company shall be bound to exercise due care to prevent the opening of such
vault, safe, box or receptacle by any person other than the lessee thereof . . .and
said parties may provide in writing the terms, conditions and liabilities in said
lease."
66 See note S4 supra.
67

See note 57 supra.
Kolt v. Cleveland Trust Co.. ....
Ohio App. .....
93 N. E. (2d) 788 (1950).
69 Kolt v. Cleveland Trust Co., supra note 68; Bernstein et a]. v. Northwestern Nat. Bank in Philadelphia, 157 Pa. Super. 73, 41 A. (2d) 440 (1945).
70 Bernstein et al. v. Northwestern Nat. Bank in Philadelphia, supra note
69.
71 Kolt v. Cleveland Trust Co.. ....
Ohio App .....
93 N. E. (2d) 788 (1950).
72 United States v. Holt, 234 Mo. App. 25, 131 S. W. (2d) 59 (1939).
68
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Since the relationship is one of bailment, it is supposed that the rule
prohibiting a bailee to limit his liability for negligence should apply.
But in Kolt v. Cleveland Trust Co., 7 3 it was held that the clause was
not contrary to the public interest. However, there is case law in
Ohio 74 indicating that there are policy considerations contrary to this
5
decision, and it has been intimated that the case may be overruled.
The particularism evident in the contract of exculpation, plus the very
elaborate safety methods employed by the bank, probably influenced
the court in upholding this particular clause.
The policy considerations in the night deposit cases present problems similar to those of safe deposit bailments. However, the manner
in which night deposits must of necessity be made may influence the
courts to permit exculpation even in those jurisdictions which hold
them invalid when applied to safe deposit companies. The bank has no
opportunity to have an agent present at the time the bailment is initiated, and if no form of exculpation be permitted, the public might
find itself without this convenient special service.
Conclusion
Courts, in determining policy, must decide whether there is a greater
public interest to be served in obtaining more low-cost banking facilities than in extending the common law protection to newer types of
services. Courts have failed to follow a consistent pattern in determining the validity of exculpatory clauses, which suggests that the
problem is probably one for the legislatures.
Exculpatory clauses in stop-payment orders should not be allowed
unless the customer knowingly and voluntarily agrees to the arrangement. This is patently the better view since the bank is under a duty
to accept an unqualified order as a necessary incident to the business
of banking.
The validity of the clauses in safe deposit and night deposit contracts depends upon the relationship which the courts or the legislatures, which actually are interpreting their public policy, imply from
the contract. If the safe deposit company is classified a landlord, the
clause probably will be upheld, but in those states where the safe
deposit company has the duties of a professional bailee, the clause
will be regarded as a nullity. Bearing in mind that in neither instance
are all the elements of a true bailment present, some protection should
be accorded the banks.
R. Emmett Fitzgerald
Joseph C. Spalding
.... Ohio App ..... 93 N. E. (2d) 788 (1950).
74 Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Constantine, 144 Ohio St. 275, 58 N. E. (2d) 658
(1944).
75 4 VAND. L. REv. 346 (1951).
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Courts
LIMITATIONS ON HABEAS CORPUS IN

THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS

The procedural status of habeas corpus in the federal courts is still
shrouded in uncertainty, notwithstanding recent attempts to clarify
it.1 There is still a lack of unanimity concerning the requirement of
an application for certiorari to the Supreme Court as part of the exhaustion doctrine. The effect of a denial of habeas corpus or of
certiorari by the Supreme Court upon a subsequent petition for habeas
corpus, has not been precisely determined. Consequently, an analysis
of the present position of habeas corpus will not be without profit. To
present first a brief history of the writ, including a discussion of its
expanded use-primarily in the last twenty years-and to investigate
the ambit of the habeas corpus power which the federal district courts
today possess is the purpose of this article.
I.
History
Illuminating historical studies of the origin and development of
habeas corpus are available elsewhere. 2 Therefore, a cursory survey
will suffice to bring the current problems into focus.
The writ, after a long struggle, was first firmly secured in statutory
form by the famous Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 3 and came to America as part of the common law. Deeming the security afforded by
this writ of vital importance, the founding fathers provided in the Constitution that "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safdty may require it." 4 In the first half of the nineteenth century,
the traditional ground for the application of the writ-namely, lack
of jurisdiction 5-was disturbed by legislation. 6 Thus began a century
of extending the scope of this ancient writ.
1

See, e.g., 63 STAT. 105 et seq. (1949), 28 U. S. C. § 2241 et seq. (Supp.

1950); Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S. 200, 70 S. Ct. 587, 94 L. Ed. 761 (1950).
2 HuED, HABEAs CoRPus 129 (2d ed. 1876); Note, The Freedom Writ-The
Expanding Use of Federal Habeas Corpts-, 61 HARv. L. REv. 657 (1948).
3

31 CAR. 2, c. 2 (1679).

4 U.S. CoNsr. Art. I § 9.
5 This ground is occasionally relied upon at the present time. Holland v.
Eidson, 90 F. Supp. 314 (W. D. Mo. 1950).
6 4 STAT. 634 (1833), extended the utilization of the writ to prisoners held
under either state or federal authority for any act committed in violation of
a law or judicial mandate of the United States. 5 STAT. 539 (1842), brought
prisoners, who were foreign subjects held by state or federal authority for acts
committed under recognized foreign law, within the protective coverage of the
writ.
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Monumental, perhaps, in this growth was the act passed in 1867 7
which gave federal courts the power to grant the writ in any case
where a person's confinement violates the Constitution, or any treaty
or law of the United States. This statute became the legal skeleton
upon which the federal courts, gradually becoming more due processminded,8 draped the federal procedural doctrines applied todaydoctrines designed to enable the federal courts to test the constitutionality of state judicial administration without impinging on the
remaining vestiges of state sovereignty.
Illustrative of these procedural principles are the following: Habeas
corpus is a writ of right and not of course. 9 Not only must a sound
case be presented, 10 but it must also appeal to the discretion of the
court as necessitating expediency." It should not be employed as
a device which interrupts the orderly proceedings in a capable court
acting with jurisdiction. 12 It should not be allowed to become a substitute for an appeal. 13
But rising above the foregoing rules are two more troublesome
doctrines: (1) the necessity of exhausting state remedies, and (2) the
"consideration" of previous action by other courts. These two doctrines play a vital role in the uncertainty surrounding habeas corpus
at the present time. They provide the point of departure for the
investigation of the basic problem to be analyzed here: admitting
that it exists in name, does any real habeas corpus power actually
reside today in the federal district courts.
To maintain that the solution of this problem lies simply in an
examination of these two rules and nothing more would indeed be
fallacious. There are other lesser factors involved. But since they
are usually allied to one or the other of the two main principles,
they will be acknowledged in the treatment of the principle to which
they are more intimately related. It is well to note that lying behind
and forming the basis for all these rules is the discretion of the court.
It still remains, ostensibly at least, within the exercise of discretion
of the federal district court, as influenced by the above principles,
either to grant or deny habeas corpus.
Generally, before a court will weigh the effect of previous court
action on a case, it will require the petitioner to show that he has
7

14 STAT. 385 (1867).

See Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S. 200, 221, 70 S. Ct. 587, 94 L. Ed. 761
(1950) (dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
9 Ex parte Frederich, 149 U. S. 70, 13 S. Ct. 793, 37 L. Ed. 761 (1893).
10 Rogers v. Peck, 199 U. S. 425, 26 S. Ct. 87, 50 L. Ed. 256 (1905).
8

11

Goto v. Lane, 265 U. S. 393, 44 S. Ct. 525, 68 L. Ed. 1070 (1924).
Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179, 27 S. Ct. 459, 51 L. Ed. 760 (1907).
13 Ex parte Belt, 159 U. S. 95, 15 S. Ct. 987, 40 L. Ed. 88 (1895).
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exhausted all of his state remedies. Therefore, the presentation of
the "previous court action" phase will follow that of the exhaustion
doctrine.
II.

Exhaustion Doctrine
The classic pronouncement of the exhaustion principle is that
found in the per curiam decision of Ex parte Hawk 14 where the
Supreme Court said:
Ordinarily an application for habeas corpus by one detained under
a state court judgment of conviction for crime will be entertained by
a federal court only after all state remedies . . . in the state courts
and in this Court by appeal or writ of certiorari, have been exhausted.

This rule, save for the significant omission of the clause referring to
an appeal or writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, has been recently codified. 15 It should be emphasized that the Court in Ex
parte Hawk stated that there must be an exhaustion of remedies
in the Supreme Court by either appeal or certiorari.
In order to show how the power of the lower federal courts has
gradually deteriorated, the history behind this alternative requirement of exhaustion by appeal or certiorari must be studied. As early
as 1886,16 it was suggested that before a lower federal court should
grant habeas corpus,, a writ of error (which has since been replaced
by an appeal to the Supreme Court17) must have been brought.
Though the Court then felt otherwise, it was only five years later
that it included the writ of error from the Supreme Court as one
of the remedies to be exhausted.1 8 The rationale behind this requirement was that a writ of error, being allowed as of course at that
14 321 U. S. 114, 116, 64 S. Ct. 448, 88 L. Ed. 572 (1944).
15 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (Supp. 1950), provides that: "An application for a
writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either
an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances
rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
"An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he -has the right
under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question
presented."
16 Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 6 S. Ct. 734, 29 L. Ed. 868 (1886).
17 A statute in 1928 provided: "That the writ of error in cases, civil and
criminal, is abolished. All relief which heretofore could be obtained by writ of
error shall hereafter be obtainable by appeal." 45 STAT. 54 (1928).
18 Wood v. Brush, 140 U. S. 278, 290, 11 S. Ct. 738, 35 L. Ed. 505 (1891).
There the court said ". . . that after the final disposition of the case by the highest court of the State, the circuit court, in its discretion, may put the party who
has been denied a right, privilege or immunity claimed under the Constitution
or laws of the United States to his writ of error from this court, rather thai
interfere by writ of habeas corpus."

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
time, 19
cedure.
tiorari,
denied

was deemed merely the next step in orderly appellate proThis reasoning cannot be applied to the rule requiring cerbecause certiorari "isa discretionary writ which may be
for various collateral reasons without judgment ever being

passed upon the merits. 2 0

Just what rationale the Court relied upon

in Ex parte Hawk for its insertion of the certiorari requirement into
the orthodox writ of error rule is difficult to determine. In not one
of the cases relied upon in the Hawk decision was the exhaustion of
the writ of certiorari required or even mentioned. 21 Thus it appears
on the surface at least that an unwarranted extension of the ex22
haustion doctrine was promulgated by the Hawk case.
The circuit courts have added several less important limitations
on the habeas corpus power of federal district courts. For instance,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit added the requirement
23
of good faith to the exhaustion rule when it said:
To make a showing of having exhausted state remedies, it is not
suficient for the seeker of Federal relief to present a plausible argument
that the state courts would probably not decide in his favor, anyway.
He must make an actual attempt to obtain redress in the state courts,
and must prosecute that attempt in good faith. [Emphasis supplied.]

In another case, a petitioner had not learned of the denial of his
writ of error coram nobis until eight days after the time limit for
appealing from it had expired. He was nevertheless told to attempt
24
to appeal irom the denial. The court said:
The fact that it was "impossible for him to have served and [to]
file a notice of appeal within five days as required by the rules governing appeals to the Supreme Court of Washington," does not excuse his
19 Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in Darr v. Burford, 339 U.
S. 200, 235, 70 S. Ct. 587, 94 L. Ed. 761 (1950), pointed out that "a writ of
error was a writ of right" until legislation in 1916, 39 STAT. 726 (1916), and in
1925, 43 STAT. 936 (1925), changed its status. After these statutes were passed,
"The right was gone. Only an opportunity-and a slim one-remained."
20 "The denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon
the merits of the case, as the bar has been told many times." United States v.
Carver, 260 U. S. 482, 490, 43 S. Ct. 181, 67 L. Ed. 361 (1923). For an indication of the character of reasons relied upon in granting certiorari, see Rule
38 (5), Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, following 28 U. S. C.
§ 354 (1946), and at 306 U. S. 718 (1938).
21 The following cases were relied upon: Ex parte Abernathy, 320 U. S.
219, 64 S. Ct. 13, 88 L. Ed. 3 (1943); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 55'
S. Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791 (1935); Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U. S. 13, 46 S. Ct. 1,
70 L. Ed. 138 (1925); Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179, 27 S. Ct. 459, 51 L.
Ed. 760 (1907); Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101, 18 S. Ct. 805, 43 L. Ed.
91 (1898).
22 A closer examination of this apparent extension will be found in the
portion of the text to which note 42 infra refers.
23 Hampson v. Smith, 162 F. (2d) 334, 335 (9th Cir. 1947).
24 Mason v. Smith, 162 F. (2d) 336, 337 (9th Cir. 1947).
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non-action in the matter. He should have made the effort, and he must
still make the effort, before he can successfully contend that he has
exhausted all state remedies.

Very similar in this respect is Woods v. Nierstheimer,25 where the
petitioner was told that he mist first exhaust his statutory coram
nobis remedy notwithstanding the fact that the statute of limitations governing it had already run.
Further indication of the waning habeas corpus power in the federal district courts was apparent in Huffman v. Smith.26 There the
court of appeals manifestly ignored the discretion vested in the district courts when it said that ".

.

. it is a condition precedent to a

consideration of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus that the
petitioner has sought the similar relief in Washington state courts."
The implication created by the use of the phrase "condition precedent" is that in no case, not even one involving unusual circumstances, may a district court consider the issuance of habeas corpus
before all the remedies have been exhausted. The usual rule, where
state remedies have not been exhausted, is that a district court may
entertain a petition for habeas corpus where there are exceptional
circumstances. 27 Finally, the Supreme Court in Mooney v. Holohan 28 added the requirement that not only the direct but also the
collateral state remedies must be exhausted.
Both the rule that certiorari from the Supreme Court and the
requirement that collateral state remedies be exhausted were given
29
general recognition until the Supreme Court decided Wade v. Mayo.
There the Court, speaking through justice Murphy, removed much
of the rigidity of both rules. Referring to the requirements of certiorari from the Supreme Court as part of the exhaustion process,
the Court saida: °
But the reasons for this exhaustion principle cease after the highest
state court has rendered a decision on the merits of the federal constitutional claim. The state procedure has then ended and there is no
longer any danger of a collision between federal and state authority.
328 U. S. 211, 66 S. Ct. 996, 90 L. Ed. 1177 (1946).
172 F. (2d) 129, 130 (9th Cir. 1949). [Emphasis supplied.)
Plaine v. Burford, 180 F. (2d) 724 (10th Cir. 1950); Cain v. Benson,
163 F. (2d) 822 (6th Cir. 1947); Ex Parte Brown, 90 F. Supp. 50 (E. D. Mich.
1950). See also 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (Supp. 1950). The Court in Ex parte Hawk,
321 U. S. 114, 118, 64 S. Ct. 448, 88 L. Ed. 572 (1944) enumerated unusual
circumstances when it said that a federal court should entertain a petition for
habeas corpus in cases ". . . where resort to state court remedies has failed to
afford a full and fair adjudication of the federal contentions raised, either because the state affords no remedy . . . or because in the particular case the remedy afforded by state law proves in practice unavailable or seriously inadequate. ... "
28 294 U. S. 103, 55 S. Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791 (1935).
29 334 U. S. 672, 68 S. Ct. 1270, 92 L. Ed. 1647 (1948).
25

26
27

SO

Id., 334 U. S. at 680.
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The problem shifts from the consummation of state remedies to the
nature and extent of the federal review of the constitutional issue. The
exertion of such review at this point, however, is not in any real sense
a part of the state procedure....
Matters relevant to the exercise of our certiorari discretion frequently result in denials of the writ without any consideration of the
merits. . . . Where it is apparent or even possible that such would be
the disposition of a petition for certiorari from the state court's judgment, failure to file a petition should not prejudice the right to file
a habeas corpus application in a district court.

Realizing this change in policy, several circuit courts upheld the
district courts in reviewing the merits of the case on a habeas corpus
petition though certiorari had not been sought. 31
The Wade case also relaxed the rule, established by the Mooney
case, 32 that all state remedies, direct and collateral, must be exhausted,
33
when the Court said:
The crucial point is that Wade [the petitioner] has exhausted one
of the two alternative routes open in the Florida courts for securing
an answer to his constitutional objection. . . . The exhaustion of but
one of several available alternatives is all that is necessary.

Shortly after the Wade decision, Congress enacted the legislation
referred to above 34 which codified the exhaustion doctrine set forth
in the Hawk case. The statute in part provides that "An applicant
[for habeas corpus] shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies . . . of the state . . . if he has the right . . . to raise, by any

available procedure, the question presented." Because of their proximity in time, there is a strange admixture in subsequent cases, of
the Mooney rule requiring the exhaustion of collateral state remedies,
the Wade doctrine that pursuance of an alternative remedy is sufficient, and the codification of the Hawk decision. A case appearing
soon after the statute was enacted, decided that the Wade rule requiring the exhaustion of but one of several state remedies could not,
in the face of the statute, be controlling. 35 Here, the petitioner already had been refused a writ of habeas corpus by the Supreme Court
of Missouri. This refusal was apparently based upon a consideration
of the federal claim of the petitioner. He was instructed to make
another attempt in the state courts since "The doctrine of exhaustion
of state court remedies to so test the legality of his detention requires
that he do so." 86
31 Miller v. Hudspeth, 176
Mayo, 173 F. (2d) 695 (Sth Cir.
32 Mooney v. Holohan, 294
33 334 U. S. 672, 677-8, 68 S.

34
35
36

F. (2d) 111 (10th Cir. 1949); Colingsworth v.
1949).
U. S. 103, 55 S. Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791 (1935).
Ct. 1270, 92 L. Ed. 1647 (1948).

See note 15 supra.
Lyle v. Stewart, 80 F. Supp. 167 (W. D. Mo. 1948).
Id. at 170.
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On the other hand, in a later case, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reached a contrary result.37 There the petitioner
failed to pursue his direct remedies and turned instead to the collateral relief of habeas corpus. The court stated, "This we understand to suffice. 'The exhaustion of but one of several available alternatives is all that is necessary,' Wade v. Mayo.... ",38
The confusion was shortlived. In 1950, the Supreme Court in
Darr v. Burford stated that "Whatever deviation Wade may imply
from the established rule will be corrected by this decision." 39 The
Court firmly restated the rule pronounced in the Hawk case,40 that
ordinarily the prisoner must petition the Supreme Court for certiorari
before seeking habeas corpus in the district courts. This case is of
great importance because it brings to a climax the conflict on the
exhaustion rule.
The importance of this decision, and its shortcomings in attempting to correct the implications of the-Wade case, were sharply outlined and criticized by Justice Frankfurter in his dissent. 41 Perhaps
the basic objection of the dissenting opinion is that the Court required a petition for certiorari (which, traditionally, can be denied
without casting any adverse shadows upon the merits) without revealing what effect a denial is to have. This, Justice Frankfurter
warned, will create grave confusion in the district courts. 42 To this,
Justice Reed, speaking for the Court, appeared to be replying when
he said: "The issue of the effect of such denial [of certiorari] .. .
37

United States ex rel. Morrison v. Foster, 175 F. (2d) 495 (2d Cir. 1949).

38

Id. at 497.

Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S. 200, 210, 70 S. Ct. 587, 94 L. Ed. 761 (1950).
Criticizing this statement as a polite method of overruling Wade v. Maya, juslice Frankfurter, in his dissent cautions, 339 U. S. at 221: "Decisions on matters
of procedure within the Court's control ought not to be like shifting sand. Quick
fluctuations in them should be avoided unless a rule of practice has proven itself
mischievous in practice. The real question before us in this case is whether Wade
v. Maya . . . should be overruled. . . . Respect for an explicit adjudication on
a matter of procedure very recently rendered after the fullest consideration, as
well as the soundness of the decision, should lead us to adhere to Wade v. Mayo!'
40 321 U. S. 114, 64 S. Ct. 448, 88 L. Ed. 572 (1944).
41 Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S. 200, 219, 70 S. Ct. 587, 94 L. Ed. 761 (1950)..
42 Id., 339 U. S. at 224-5: "Some judges will infer that denial of certiorari
bears on the exercise of habeas corpus jurisdiction. Others will feel they should
adhere to this Court's old avowals concerning denial until they are told explicitly
to the contrary. Most confusing of all, many judges . . .are unlikely to resolve
the ambiguity decisively. Instead, they will take an equivocal position in denying
a writ of habeas corpus, relying in part on the discretionary aspect of habeas
corpus and in part on the fact that this Court denied certiorari." Some of these
fears have been realized indeed. One writer has already pointed out that the
court in Goodwin v. Smyth, 181 F. (2d) 499 (4th Cir 1950), has taken Justice
Frankfurter's "equivocal" position. 2 STAN. L. REv. 788, 793 (1950). The same
might also be said of the decision in Commonwealth ex rel. Gibbs v. Ashe, 93
F. Supp. 542 (W. D. Pa. 1950).
39
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is not here in this case. We doubt the effectiveness of a voluntary
statement on a point not in issue." 43
The dissent also points out that cases involving federal claims by
state prisoners often involve complex local laws which must be construed and properly applied before the federal questions can be answered. The cases cited in the dissent 4 exemplify the confusion resulting where the Supreme Court, unfamiliar with the peculiar state
law, takes the case directly from the state court on certiorari rather
than allowing the district court, familiar with the local laws, to clarify
the issues in a habeas corpus proceeding. In the majority opinion,
Justice Reed, apparently fully aware of this difficulty, points out: 4 5
There may be issues of state procedure . . . problems made difficult by the frequent practice of state courts to dismiss the applicatio~s
without opinion. If this Court has doubts concerning the basis of
state court judgments, the matter may be handled . . . with an express direction that the petitioner may proceed in the federal district
court without prejudice from the denial of his petition for certiorari.

Justice Frankfurter rallied with the reply that: 4 6
Instead of allowing these local issues to be canvassed initially in
the District Courts, it is now proposed . . .that they be brought here
enveloped in the fog of State procedural law and then . .. [be left]
to the District Courts to lift the fog after we have concluded that it is
too thick for us to pierce. Such procedure, I submit, would neither
further the administration of justice nor be conducive to the proper
use of this Court's time....

The differences of opinion as to the importance of allowing only
the highest federal tribunal to reverse the highest state tribunal
seems to underlie all of the preceding points of controversy. The inconvenience occasioned by requiring all cases to come up to the
Supreme Court on certiorari in the first instance is more than offset,
according to the Court, by the benefits derived from the preservation
of the dual system of government. The dissent, on the other hand,
also recognizing that the proper federal-state relationship should be
maintained, does not place this desirable relationship above the practical and more expedient procedure of allowing district courts to rule
on state convictions in the first instance.
III.
PriorCourt Action Doctrine
The consideration in a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal district court of previous determinations by another court involves two
situations. The first arises out of a previous application for a writ
43
44
45
46

Darr v.
Id., 339
Id., 339
Id., 339

Burford, 339 U. S. 200, 214, 70 S. Ct. 587, 94 L. Ed. 761 (1950).
U. S. at 230.
U. S. at 215.
U. S. at 232.
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of habeas corpus, in either a state or federal court. The second concerns the effect to be given a denial by the Supreme Court of certiorari to the state court upholding the conviction.
It was established at an early date that denial of a writ of habeas
corpus would not be considered res judicata. 47 However, because of
the great number of applications flooding the federal courts, 48 the

trend in recent years has been to allow the court examining the application to "consider" previous denials. 49 An expression of this doctrine was aptly propounded in a recent federal decision where the court
said: 50
While action of the Virginia courts [in denying habeas corpus] and
the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court [on the habeas corpus
petition] were not binding on the principle of res judicata, they were
matters entitled to respectful consideration by the court below; and
in the absence of some most unusual situation, they were sufficient reason
for that court to deny a further writ of -habeas corpus. [Emphasis
supplied.]

While most courts have followed the rule that former denials are not
to be considered res judicata, the "respectful consideration" which
they are to give to former denials has caused an effect not far removed from res judicata. 5 1 This is especially true in a situation
where the allegations in the second petition for habeas corpus bring
to the court's attention the identical grounds urged by the petitioner
in the earlier application for the writ. If the first petition has been
denied, after a full hearing, then the court may deny the second on
52
this basis alone.
47 In Carruth v. Taylor, 8 N. D. 166, 172, 77 N. W. 617 (1898), the court
observed that, "At common law . . . an order in habeas corpus proceedings remanding the petitioner to custody is not res judicata. The first adjudication at
common law was not a bar to another inquiry upon the same state of facts."
48 See chart of statistics in Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S. 200, 233, 70 S. Ct.
587, 94 L. Ed. 761 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
49 Holiday v. Maryland, 177 F. (2d) 844 (4th Cir. 1949); United States
ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F. (2d) 644 (3d Cir. 1944); Slaughter v. Wright, 135
F. (2d) 613 (4th Cir. 1943); Beard v. Bennett, 114 F. (2d) 578 (D. C. Cir.
1940); United States ex rel. Bergdoll v. Drum, 107 F. (2d) 897 (2d Cir. 1939).
50 Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 163 F. (2d) 498. 499 (4th Cir. 1947). In this
case the petitioner had filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Corporation
Court of the City of Newport News. When this court dismissed the petition,
he appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a writ of error.
Upon the denial of the writ he turned to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court denied the writ, Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 323 U. S.
754, 65 S. Ct. 81, 89 L. Ed. 603 (1944). Then he filed a petition for habeas
corpus in the Federal District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia. When this petition was refused, the appeal in the instant
case followed.
51 Garrison v. Johnston, 151 F. (2d) 1011 (9th Cir. 1945); Slaughter v.
Wright, 135 F. (2d) 613 (4th Cir. 1943); United States ex rel. Bruno v. Reimer,
103 F. (2d) 341 (2d Cir. 1939).
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Perhaps the more difficult segment of this "effect of prior court
action" phase is the proper consideration to be given prior action of
the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari. A distinction might
be drawn between the result where certiorari was granted and the
merits of the case reviewed, and where certiorari was denied, which
does not indicate that the merits were considered. However, since the
Supreme Court in White v. Ragen53 restated a single rule applying
to both alternatives, the inference is that the distinction is immaterial.
The Court in that case, citing Ex parte Hawk,54 stated that:
If the Court denies certiorari after a state court decision on the
merits, or if it reviews the case on the merits, a federal district court
will not usually re-examine on habeas corpus the question thus adjudicated.

The fact that this rule treats both a denial of certiorari and a review upon certiorari as being of equal significance in the subsequent
petition for habeas corpus has caused a definite divergence of judicial
opinion. At least one circuit court has stated that a denial of certiorari is not res judicata and has no prejudicial effect whatever upon
the merits of the petitioner's claim.5 5 On the other hand, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has regarded a denial of certiorari
as tantamount to a final adjudication. In the case of Schechtman v.
Foster,56 Judge Learned Hand stated that "unless we are altogether
to disregard the action of the court of last resort [the Supreme Court]
in the very case itself, the denial ought to be conclusive."
This controversy still persists. Certiorari may be denied on any
one of several collateral grounds; 57 consequently, it may or may not
involve a determination upon the merits. It, therefore, is argued that
the rule requiring a district court to "consider" the denial is an
additional restriction upon the habeas corpus power of the district
courts.
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis of the various rules has attempted to illustrate what appears to be a trend toward the withdrawal of habeas
corpus power from the federal district courts in cases dealing with state
incarceration. This withdrawal has been effected by broadening the
concept of the exhaustion doctrine which operates to preclude the
52 Swihart v. Johnston, 150 F. (2d) 721 (9th Cir. 1945); Gutterman v.
Hiatt, 65 F. Supp. 285 (M. D. Pa. 1946).
53
54

55
56

57

324 U. S. 760, 65 S. Ct. 798, 89 L. Ed. 1348 (1945).
321 U. S. 114, 118, 64 S. Ct. 448, 88 L. Ed. 572 (1944).

McCrea v. Jackson, 148 F. (2d) 193 (6th Cir. 1945).
172 F. (2d) 339 (2d Cir. 1949).
See note 20 supra.

NOTES
district court from entertaining the petition in the first instance;
and by means of the expanded "prior court action" formula which
warns the district court, after the remedies have been exhausted, not
to re-examine the merits because another court-either the Supreme
Court by a denial of certiorari or a state supreme court by a denial
of habeas corpus-has already done so. An illustration of this
dilemma with which the district courts today are confronted is the
view announced in Bernard v. Brady.5 8 Two petitions had been filed
with and denied by the Supreme Court. The court, reviewing a subsequent denial of habeas corpus by a district court, stated: 5 9
If the petitions to the Supreme Court be treated as the equivalent
of an application for certiorari, the petition below was properly denied,
since a federal district court should not ordinarily grant a writ where
the Supreme Court denies certiorari after a state court decision on the
merits [application of the "prior court action" rule]; if those petitions
be not treated as the equivalent of certiorari, the petition below for
habeas corpus was properly denied since the remedies available under

state law had not been exhausted [application of the exhaustion rule].
In the final analysis, the clash in judicial opinion on the habeas
corpus power of federal district courts has its roots in the conflict
between two opposing judicial philosophies. The present view of the
Supreme Court tends to emphasize the necessity of zealously maintaining the traditional federal-state relationship as the safest method
of preserving personal freedom. The opposing philosophy refuses to
sacrifice individual rights merely to preserve a nebulous concept like
the "proper federal-state relationship." Consequently, the former adheres to the rule that, ordinarily, only the highest federal tribunal
should review actions of the highest state court. The latter deems
it more important tliat a prisoner, who claims unlawful detention,
be given a federal hearing and if found to be wrongfully detained, be
released as quickly as possible by a court conversant with local law.
This group also maintains that a state court should be compelled to
tolerate a slight affront in order to safeguard the more fundamental
interest of individual rights. Consequently, fluctuations in procedural
rules probably will exist so long as these dissimilar philosophies are
represented in force in the Supreme Court.
Bernard James McGraw
Robert A. Stewart

58 164 F. (2d) 881 (4th Cir. 1947).
59 Id. at 882.
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MEMBERSHIP

IN

OR

AFFILIATION

WITH

THE

COMMUNIST

PARTY AS GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENT

On February 26, 1951, the American Bar Association adopted 1 the

following resolution:

2

Resolution III
BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association recommend that all State and Local Bar Associations or appropriate authorities immediately commence disciplinary actions of disbarment of all
lawyers who are members of the Communist Party of the United States
or who advocate Marxism-Leninism.

This resolution appears, in itself, to be an attack on the very civil

liberties which require protection from abuse by Communists, since
it would in effect, deprive a man of his livelihood in his chosen profession. It must be remembered, however, that a Communist is not
merely a believer in the philosophy of Marx and Lenin, but an active
worker toward world revolution. 3 Confronted with this fact, some
definite and affirmative action by responsible authority was necessary. 4
The various departments of the Government, after long, careful,
and complete investigations, have acted in the manner required to
protect this nation against the Communist menace. In 1947, the
Committee on Un-American Activities made its report to the House
5
of Representatives on the purposes and ends of the Communist Party.
The Committee pointed out that the Communist Party is not only
a political society, but an organization whose ideology is incompatible with the American way of life, and which will not stop short
of force or violence if those measures are necessary to further the
scheme for world revolution. Basing its action on this and other
reports of the Committee, Congress has enacted legislation restricting
Communist activity in the United States. 6 The Executive Depart1
2

N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1951, p. 14, col. 4.
Copy of REPORT or TnE SPEcrAL Co mrrEE To STUDY COmmUNISr TAcTICS AND OBJECTIVES OF Tu AmxEIcAN BAR AssocIATioN.
3 See American Communications Ass'n, C. I. 0. et al. v. Douds, 339 U. S.
382, 431, 70 S. Ct. 674, 94 L. Ed. 597 (1950) (concurring opinion).

4 See the discussion of the various restraints already imposed on Communists in RExPY, Cvi RIGjTS iN THE UNITED STATES (195-1); Cohen and
Fuchs, Communism's Challenge and the Constitution, 34 CoRN. L. Q. 182 (1948);

Emerson and Hetfield, Loyalty Among Government Employees, 58 YA=E L. J.
1 (1948); Notes, May the States, by Statute, Bar Subversive Groups from the
Ballot, 25 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 319 (1950), Communism's Criminality, 23 NOTRE
DAvm LAW. 577 (1948), Constitutionality of State Legislation Affecting Public
Employees, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 541 (1950).
5 H. R. RFP. No. 4581, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
6 Pub. L. No. 831, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 22, 1950).
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ment has taken steps to insure loyalty among its employees. 7 In
holding a refusal to answer questions about Communist affiliation to
be contempt, one state court declared that " [communist] social and
political theories are vastly different from those understood and supported by the loyal citizens of our democracy." 8
The Court of Appeals of British Columbia has recently taken action
similar to that proposed in the American Bar Association resolution
by denying a Communist applicant admission to the bar of that province, observing in the course of its opinion that: 9
It has come to be universally accepted in the Western nations that
it is dangerous to our way of life to allow a known Communist or
Communist sympathizer to remain in a position of trust or influence.

The rationale of the Canadian decision and the principle of the
American Bar Association Resolution are essentially the same: membership in bench or bar is a position of trust and influence; Communists have convincingly demonstrated that they will take advantage of those positions to advance their cause, the destruction of free
institutions; therefore, the courts, through their inherent powers, are
entitled to protect themselves from internal enemies by denying Communists admission to or continuance in the practice of law.
The tactics that are to be employed by Communists in the courts
have been vividly illustrated in a pamphlet entitled Under Arrest,'0
published and distributed in 1934 by the International Labor Defense, an organization designated as Communistic." The pamphlet
advises its reader to ridicule the dignity and sanctity of the courtroom and to prostitute the trial so that it serves, not as an instrument of justice, but as a sounding board& for Communist ideology.
It instructs the "Party" to demonstrate in front of the courthouse,
and to interfere in every conceivable way with the administration of
judicial business.
A recent report to the House of Representatives by the UnAmerican Activities Committee quotes another pamphlet that briefly
12
summed up the purposes of the Communist in courtrooms:
A Communist mmt utilize a political trial to help on the revolutionary struggle. Our tactics in the public proceedings of the law courts
are not tactics of defense but of attack. Without clinging to legal for7 Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 FED. Rwo. 1935 (1947); Note, Constitutional
Lau-The President's Loyalty Order-Standards, Procedure and Constitutional

Aspects, 46 MicH. L. Rav. 942 (1948).
8 Fawick Airflex Co. v. United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of

America, Local 735, C. I. 0. et al., 87 Ohio App. 371, 92 N. E. (2d) 436, 446
appealdismissed, 154 Ohio St. 106, 93 N. E. (2d) 409 (1950).
9 Martin v. The Law Society, [1950] 3 D. L. R. 173 (B. C. Ct. of App.).
10 INTERNATIoNAL LABoR DEFENSE PASSPoLET No. 5, UNDER ARREST (1934).
11 See 94 CONG. REa. 4850 (1948).
12 H. R. REP. No. 3123, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950).
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malities the Communist must use the trial as a means of bringing his
indictments against the dominant capitalist regime and of courageously
voicing the veiw of his party.

The most recent example of this interference with judicial proceedings was the ordeal of Judge Medina in the trial of the eleven
Communists 13 for violation of the Smith Act. 14 The defense attorneys made little effort to exonerate their clients-the sole purpose of
the trial was to make a mockery of American justice. These lawyers
heaped abuse upon the United States, the court, and its officers, and
made repeated efforts to fill the record with error so that the case
would go through repeated appeals and be kept in the eyes of the
public ad infinitum. The Communists who were being tried were to
be martyrs for the party.
The foregoing examples of Communist courtroom tactics, actual
and projected, raise the question whether the courts of this country
must be subjected to these indignities before they can protect themselves, or whether they may take action against the Communist advocate before he steps into the courtroom. In almost every disbarment proceeding, mention is made of the fact that the power to disbar
should be exercised with great caution, and that it should be used
only where the attorney's continuance in practice would be subversive to the proper administration of justice and the integrity of the
profession. 15 It is with this thought in mind that the merits of Resolution III of the American Bar Association will be examined.
I.
The Court of Appeals of British Columbia recently upheld the
Benchers of the Law Society of that province in their refusal to admit
an avowed Communist to the practice of law.16 The Society concluded, upon an investigation of the ideological values, motives, and
loyalties of an adherent of the alien philosophy of Communism, that
a person of this belief was undesirable as a member of the bar. Although there was no affirmative evidence that the applicant had advocated the overthrow of the government by force or non-constitutional
methods, or that he had been engaged in subversive activities, the
court pointed out that the end of Communist activity is world revolution, and inferred that anyone who believes in Marxist teachings
must necessarily advocate the destruction of all free governments.
The appellant expounded at great length upon freedom of expression, freedom of thought, freedom of the individual, and the protecSee United States v. Sacher et al., 182 F. (2d) 416 (2d Cir. 1950).
14 18 U. S. C. § 2385 (Supp. 1950).
15 See e.g., In re Donaghy, 402 Ill. 120, 83 N. E. (2d) 560 (1948).
16 Martin v. The Law'Society, [1950] 3 D. L. R. 173 (B. C. Ct. of App.).
13
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tion of minorities in arguing that he should not be denied the "right"
7
to practice law. Commenting on this, the court stated:'
How these "freedoms" can be invoked on behalf of an avowed Communist to place him in a position where he could more effectively destroy
them, is a paradox. But this type of paradox is consistent with the
Communist plan of infiltration which disclosures in the United States in
particular have made a matter of common knowledge in our day.

In future cases, a distinction may be attempted because of the fact
that this was a case involving admission to the bar and not disbarment.
But there is a great deal of authority to the effect that since national
loyalty is an essential qualification for admission to practice, an attorney may be disbarred whenever he ceases to possess this quality.' 8
The court in the Martin case recognized this theory by way of dicta
in stating: ' 9
• . . if a well known lawyer member of the Liberal party or of the
Progressive-Conservative party should publicly declare his belief in
Marxist Communism, the Benchers of the Law Society might well find
it their duty (after a proper hearing, of course) to disbar him from
practice. Such action by the Benchers would not be directed toward his
"political opinions" but toward beliefs of his inimical to his country
and repugnant to the ancient and honorable profession of law ...

There is no reason to conclude that a higher standard of morals and
ethics should be required of a person seeking admission to the bar
than that required for one to remain a member. Both should be on
an equally high plane.
Among the requisite qualities of a lawyer is loyalty to both state
and federal governments; before a prospective attorney is admitted
to practice, he is required to take an oath in which he swears to support both the state and federal constitutions. An oath of this nature
is repugnant to the belief in Communist philosophy. In 1945, the
United States Supreme Court, in the case of In re Summers, upheld
a decision of an Illinois court in which a conscientious objector was
refused admission to the Illinois Bar because the examiners thought
his religious beliefs would be inconsistent with the obligations of an
attorney.2 0 The petitioner was willing to take the oath but the examiners felt that he could not do so in good faith. Undoubtedly, the
Communists also would be most willing to take the oath, but past
experience proves that an oath is meaningless to the Communist where
he can further the ends of his Party.
Communists can be expected to rely upon every constitutional
guarantee of individual freedom as a shield for their efforts to destroy
Ibid.
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Meyerovitz, 278 I1. 356, 116 N. E.
189 (1917); Underwood v. Commonwealth, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 32, 105 S.W. 151
17

18

(1907).
'9
20

Martin v. The Law Society, [1950] 3 D. L. R. 173 (B. C. Ct. of App.).
In re Summers, 325 U. S.561, 65 S.Ct. 1307, 89 L. Ed. 1795 (1945).
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the very institutions which guarantee these liberties. In the Summers
case, the conscientious objector raised the issue of his constitutional
right, to freedom of religion. This was one of the few freedoms which
was not invoked in the Martin case. If such an issue is ever raised
in the future, the Summers decision should be controlling authority.
In Cohen v. Wright 21 an attack was made on the constitutionality
of a statute providing that attorneys should take an oath of allegiance
as a condition precedent to admission to the bar. The court rejected
22
this contention by stating:
The public have a right to demand that no person shall be permitted
to aid in the administration of Justice whose character is tainted with
dishonesty, corruption, crime, and we will add, disloyalty, or treasonable act. [Emphasis supplied.]

A brief review of cases of disbarment for disloyalty to the Government will give some insight into the problem at hand. In 1919, the
Supreme Court of Texas held that it was not "dishonorable conduct"
under the Texas disbarment statute for an attorney to say to another:
"Germany is going to win the war and I hope she will." 23 It should
be noted that the court in this case felt that it sho~ild be bound absolutely by the grounds for disbarment specifically listed in the disbarment statute. The judiciary in a minority of states feel themselves
so bound.2 4 However, the majority of the states' judiciary rightfully
hold that the disbarment statutes are mere guides to the discretion
of the courts. 2 5

Since an attorney is an officer of' the court in the

state wherein he is practicing, his conduct should be controlled by the
judiciary, anal legislative enactments should be considered only as an
aid to the courts in the determination of the minimum standards required of an attorney.
In 1918, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that an attorney could
be disbarred for violating the federal statute imposing punishment
for making false reports with the intent to interfere with enlistments. 26
In 1920, this court once again came to the same conclusion on a similar set of facts.2 7

In both instances, the court held that a violation

of the Selective Service Act was the commission of a crime involving
moral turpitude. Today, one who advocates the overthrow of the
Government by force violates the Smith Act, an analogous situation.
21

22 Cal. 293 (1863).

22

Id.

23

at 320.

Lotto v. State, 208 S.W. 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
24 Sullivan v. State Bar, 28 Cal. (2d) 488, 170 P. (2d) 888 (1946); State
ex rel. Grievance Committee of Oregon State Bar Ass'n et al. v. Woerndle, 109
Ore. 461, 220 Pac. 744 (1923); In re Wells, 121 Wash. 68, 208 Pac. 25 (1922).
25 See e.g., In re Cox, 164 Kan. 160, 188 P. (2d) 652 (1949); In re Taylor,
309 Ky. 388, 217 S.W. (2d) 954 (1949).
26 In re Hofstede, 31 Idaho 448, 173 Pac. 1087 (1918).
27 In re Kenl, 32 Idaho 737, 188 Pac. 40 (1920).
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A violation of this Act would certainly bc a crime involving moral
turpitude and would, consequently, be grounds for disbarment.
The case of In re Margolis,28 decided whether an attorney could
be disbarred for actively participating in an organization attempting
to nullify a law, even though he had never been prosecuted for its
violation and it could not be shown that he had made an actual
attempt to obstruct the operation of the statute. It was held that the
attorney could be disbarred on these grounds.
The defendant, Margolis, admitted that he was an anarchist, a syndicalist, a Communist, a Bolshevik, a member of the Industrial Workers of the World, and of an anarchistic organization known as the
Union of Russian Workers. The lower court found that the aims of
these various groups were in conflict with the principles of our country,
and that persons supporting these theories could not uphold the constitution and the laws of the state and the United States. When the
defendant claimed his right to freedom of speech, liberty, and so on,
the court quoted from a previous case which had stated: 29
. . . all persons owing allegiance to the government, or residing within
its jurisdiction, owe to it obedience to its Constitution and laws, and
aid and support against all who seek its destruction. When the citizen
or resident refuses to render this obedience and support; when he aids,
assists, countenances, or encourages those who are struggling to overthrow
the government-he no longer -has a just daim to the aid of the government to enforce his rights.

The court further declared, in regard to the repugnancy between the
and the oath taken
advocacy of the overthrow of government by force
0
by an attorney upon his admission to practice: 3
Such conduct as here shown, if indulged in by anyone, would tend
to wrongdoing, but in the case of an attorney, whose duty it is to uphold the law, and not encourage a breach thereof . . . it constitutes a
positive disregard of the official obligation which he solemnly entered
into when he took his oath of office.

In the case of In re Smitk, 31 the attorney whose disbarment was
sought had made public addresses advocating sabotage, syndicalism
and general violation of the law as a step toward social reform under
the auspices of the Industrial Workers of the World. The court sets
out the purpose of the I.W.W. and quotes extensively from its literature to prove that the organization advocated anarchy by subtle
sabotage. It was claimed that the I.W.W. literature introduced in
evidence contained the earlier ideas of the organization, and that its
later pronouncements denounced these doctrines. It was also contended
28
29
30
31

269 Pa. 206, 112 At. 479 (1921).
Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293, 325 (1863).
In re Margolis, 269 Pa. 206, 112 At. 478,480 (1921).
133 Wash. 145, 233 Pac. 288 (1925).
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that these doctrines of sabotage were preached but never practiced.
32
The court refused to accept this argument and concluded:
The defendant is freely conceded the right to advocate, either
publicly or privately, changes in the present form of government, however great or however fundamental such changes may be, so long as his
advocacy is confined to means sanctioned by law. But he oversteps permissible bounds when he advocates changes by criminal or other unlawful means ...

The dissenting opinion 33 pointed out that the attorney was not
a member of the I.W.W. and that the record did not disclose any
evidence that he had advocated the views expressed in the I.W.W.
literature, in so far as they advocated sabotage, syndicalism, or actual
violations of law. However, the majority felt that the attorney's association with the I.W.W. was sufficient to warrant his disbarment.
The holding of this case is particularly significant in that the attorney
was not a member of the I.W.W., but only associated with it. This
makes his position analogous to a "fellow traveler" of the Communist
Party.

II.
Underlying each decision examined is the idea that a lawyer is
an officer of the court, and that he is, and rightly should be, subject
to regulation and control by the judicial system which he serves,
whether state or federal. Although an early decision has held that
the practice of law is a property right, 34 the great weight of authority
properly classifies it as a privilege. In the words of the Kentucky
court: 35
This license, a personal privilege, is burdened with pre-existing as
well as subsequent conditions calculated to uphold and maintain the
dignity of the court, the ethics of the profession and the welfare of all
concerned with the administration of justice.

As a logical derivative of this characterization, the courts generally do not construe a disbarment proceeding in the nature of a criminal action, or the disbarment itself as a punishment, 36 but, as stated
in In re Keenen: 3 7
Its purpose is to exclude from the office of an attorney in the courts
for the preservation of the purity of the courts and the protection of the
public, one who has demonstrated that he is not a proper person to
hold such office. [Emphasis supplied.]
32

Id., 233 Pac. at 291.
Ibid.
34 Ex parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa. 220 (1880).
35 In re Taylor, 309 Ky. 388, 217 S. W. (2d) 954, 957 (1949).
36 In re Rothrock, 16 Cal. (2d) 449, 106 P. (2d) 907 (1940); In re Keenan,
310 Mass. 166, 37 N. E. (2d) 516 (1941). But see In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602,
214 N. W. 379, 386 (1927).
37 310 Mass. 166, 37 N. E. (2d) 516, 519 (1941).
33
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A prediction whether the word "demonstrated" refers only to overt
acts depends upon the analysis of the law dealing with the source
and extent of the power which regulates the privileges of membership
in the bar. The legislature, by use of its police power, may govern
the privilege of practicing law.38 For the public good, the legislature
may prescribe minimum educational 39 and character qualifications; 40
it may punish the practice of law without a license; 41 it may compel
a lawyer to accept the fee stipulated in the state workman's compensations law; 4 2 it may prescribe oaths designated to exclude those
who served the Confederacy from practicing within the state, 43 and
oaths which require the candidate to swear that he will defend the
United States and the state in which he will practice law.4 4 Could
not to this be addled a statute refusing the privilege to a Communist?
Certainly the good of the public is no better served by protecting
the worker from excessive lawyer's fees, or by oaths which, in effect,
prevented ex-sympathizers of the Confederacy and conscientious objectors from practicing law, than it would be by the denial of the
privilege to those who designate "the capitalist court as a class
enemy." 45
It must be noted, however, that the legislature's power over the
practice of law extends only to the limits of its police power. 46 Even
in England, Parliament, which incorporates the powers of all branches
of government, merely regulated but did not seek to control absolutely
the admission of attorneys.4 7 In the United States, with the separa38 Brydonjack v. State Bar of California, 208 Cal. 439, 281 Pac. 1018 (1929) ;
346, 8 N. E. (2d) 941,
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 nl1.
cert. denied, 302 U. S. 728, 58 S. Ct. 49, 82 L. Ed. 562 (1937); Lowell Bar
Ass'n et al. v. Loeb et al.,
315 Mass. 176, 52 N. E. (2d) 27 (1943) ; In re Opinion
of Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N. E. 725 (1932); Detroit Bar Ass'n et al. v.
Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich. 216, 276 N. W. 365 (1937); Clark v.
Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S. W. (2d) 977 (1937); Judd et al. v. City Trust &
Savings Bank et al., 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N. E. (2d) 288 (1937); Nelson et al. v.
Smith et al.,107 Utah 382, 154 P.- (2d) 634 (1944); Application of Levy, 23
Wash. (2d) 607, 161 P. (2d) 651 (1945); Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 11
N. W. (2d) 604 (1943).
39 Institute of Metropolis v. University of the State of New York, 249 App.
Div. 33, 291 N. Y. Supp. 893 (3d Dep't 1936), aff'd without opinion, 274 N. Y.
504, 10 N. E. (2d) 521 (1937).
40 In re Applicants for License, 143 N. C. 1, 55 S. E. 635 (1906).
41 Berk v. State ex rel. Thompson, 225 Ala. 324, 142 So. 832 (1932).
42 Yeiser v. Dysart et al., 267 U. S. 540, 45 S. Ct. 399, 69 L. Ed. 775 (1925);
209 Ind. 541, 200 N. E. 219 (1936).
Buckler v. Hilt et al.,
43 Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293 (1863); Ex parte Quarrier and Fitzhugh, 4
2 W. Va. 122 (1867).
IV. Va. 210 (1870); Ex parte Hunter et al.,
44 In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561, 65 S. Ct. 1307, 89 L. Ed. 1795 (1945).
45 INTERNATIONAL LABOR D]3rFrsE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 7.
46 State ex rel. Ralston v. Turner, 141 Neb. 556, 4 N. W. (2d) 302 (1942);
Application of Levy, 23 Wash. (2d) 607, 161 P. (2d) 651 (1945).
47 In re Day et al., 181 Ill.
73, 54 N. E. 646, 648 (1899).
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tion of powers into three branches of government, the courts reserved
to themselves, as a corollary of their exclusive right to administer
48
justice, regulation of the admission and discipline of attorneys.
The courts designate this reservation as an "inherent power," 49 one
that is necessarily implied for the performance of their functions.
Consequently, a court construes any valid exercise of the legislature's
police power as a limitation on the applicant rather than a limitation
on the court's power. 50 A court, then, will not tolerate any legislation on the subject that it deems an unreasonable exercise of police
power, or which it regards as an infringement upon its inherent rights.
For this reason, legislation setting the standards under which a veteran
might be admitted to the bar was held not to control where it conflicted with a court rule on the subject, 51 and a statute designating
acceptable law schools was held unconstitutional as an usurpation
of the court's inherent power. 52 The legislature may not vacate an
order for disbarment, 53 or reinstate a lawyer once he has been disbarred. 54 A statute declaring that the handling of personal injury
claims is not the practice of law, and therefore open to the layman,
was held invalid as an indirect attempt to regulate the admission of
attorneys and beyond the legislative power. 5 While state courts
respected an oath prescribed by the legislature preventing citizens of
the Confederacy from practicing law within the state as a reasonable
exercise of the state police power, 56 the Supreme Court of the United
States did not so regard an oath prescribed by Congress diected
toward those practicing in federal courts. It was declared
unconsti57
tutional as an ex post facto law and bill of attainder.
A serious question, then, is presented as to whether any statute
designed to exclude Communists from the practice of law would
exceed the limits of the legislatures' power in the states and in the
Federal Government. Naturally, this question need not be answered
48

Laughlin v. Clephane et al., 77 F. Supp. 103 (D. D. C. 1947); Application
25 NoTRE DAiM LAW.
143 (1949); In re Day et al., 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646 (1899); Lowell Bar Ass'n
et al. v. Loeb et al., 315 Mass. 176, 52 N. E. (2d) 27 (1943); State ex rel. Ralston v. Turner, 141 Neb. 556, 4 N. W. (2d) 302 (1942); Ruckenbrod v. Mullins
et al., 102 Utah 548, 133 P. (2d) 325 (1943); State ex rel. Laughlin v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 26 Wash. (2d) 914, 176 P. (2d) 301 (1947); Application of
of Kaufman et al., 69 Idaho 297, 206 P. (2d) 528 (1949),

Levy, 23 Wash. (2d) 607, 161 P.

(2d) 651 (1945); In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374,

240 N. W. 441 (1932); see case in Note, 144 A. L. R. 150 (1943).
49 See note 48 supra.
50
51

52
53

54
55
56
57

In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N. W. 441, 450 (1932).

Application of Levy, 23 Wash. (2d) 607, 161 P. (2d) 651 (1945).
State ex rel. Ralston v. Turner, 141 Neb. 556, 4 N. W. (2d) 302 (1942).
In re Phillips, 17 Cal. (2d) 55, 109 P. (2d) 344 (1941).
In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N. W. 441 (1932).
Meunier v. Bernich et al., 170 So. 567 (La. App. 1936).
See note 43 supra.
Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366 (U. S. 1867).
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in the same way in every state or in the federal courts. Witness
the divergence on the validity of the test oaths pointed out above.
This question could be avoided, however, if the courts, state and
federal, would see fit to exclude Communists from the practice of law.
Appropriate action could be taken under the courts' present rules
governing the requirements of moral fitness and loyalty of lawyers.
The Canadian "Benchers" acted in this manner to deny a Communist applicant the privilege of practicing law, 58 and the Supreme
Court of Illinois, holding that a conscientious objector could not
honestly take an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the
United States and of Illinois, denied his admission. 59 If a conscientious objector could be refused admittance to the bar by a state court,
the argument for refusing admission or disbarring a Communist is
even stronger. If the courts of the several states determined that
their present rules were insufficient to accomplish this result, they
might be prevailed upon to issue new rules to eliminate the dangers
that the practicing Communist lawyer creates. Certainly, action by
the court upon rules of its own making is to be preferred over a statute.
Such a rule could be fashioned by the court to meet its own needs,
and would be far more flexible than a statute. The evil created by
the Communist lawyer is directed toward the court, and as long as
the court has the power to protect itself, the method should be its
to choose.
The Supreme Court of the United States would have jurisdiction
to review the results of either the statute or the court rule. Although
the practice of law has consistently been held to be neither a privilege
nor immunity of a citizen of the United States within the purview of
the Fourteenth Amendment,"0 nor a property right, 6 1 the fact remains that the Supreme Court has reviewed cases concerning the
subject of disbarment.
Although the cases are not clear, the basis for review is that the
practice of law is a liberty, within the definition of the Fourteenth
Amendment, that cannot be denied without due process of law. This
conclusion is borne out by the fact that each time the Supreme Court
[19501 3 D. L. R. 173 (B. C. Ct. of App.).
In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561, 65 S. Ct. 1307, 89 L. Ed. 1795 (1945).
60 Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U. S. 540, 45 S. Ct. 399, 69 L. Ed. 775 (1925);
Ex Parte Lockwood, 154 U. S. 116, 14 S. Ct. 1082, 38 L. Ed. 929 (1894); Brad58

Martin v. The Law Society,

59

well v. Illinois, 16 Wall. 130, 21 L. Ed. 442 (U. S. 1873); Mitchell v. Greenough

et al., 100 F. (2d) 184, (9th Cir. 1938); Brents v. Stone et al.,
60 F. Supp. 82
(E. D. Ill.
1945); State ex rel. Ralston v. Turner, 141 Neb. 556, 4 N. W. (2d)
302 (1942); Ruckenbrod v. Mullins et al., 102 Utah 548, 133 P. (2d) 325 (1943).
61 Wernimont v. State ex rel. Little Rock Bar Ass'n, 101 Ark. 210, 142 S. W.
194 (1911); In

re Taylor, 309 Ky. 388, 217 S. W.

(2d)

954 (1949); accord,

Yeiser v. Dysart, supra note 60; Laughlin v. Clephane et al., 77 F. Supp. 103
(D. D.C. 1947).
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has considered the question, it has reasserted that the practice of
law is a state-created "right" (contrary to the general holding of
state courts that it is a privilege 62) which is subject to reasonable
restrictions. 63 While the Supreme Court has yet to find that any action
by the state is unreasonable, the very fact that reasonableness is required would give rise to the inference that the practice of law is
a liberty within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. True
enough, the Supreme Court at one time determined that congressional
action respecting the practice of law in the form of a test oath was
an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder, 64 but this decision was
based on a determination that disbarment was a punishment. Disbarment is no longer considered a punishment, 65 in the absence of
which there cannot be an ex post facto law or bill of attainder. This
test oath was distinguished from the non-Communist oath required by
the Taft-Hartfey law on the grounds that the test oath applied to
past actions while in the non-Communist oath, ".

.

. they are subject

to possible loss of position only because there is substantial ground
for the congressional judgment that their beliefs and loyalties will be
transformed into future conduct." 66
The conclusion at which the Supreme Court may arrive on the
constitutionality of the suggested statutes or court rules will best be
based on the results of the most recent cases on the subject. As outlined before, the Summers case 67 stands for the proposition that
a conscientious objector may be denied the privilege to practice law
by the state, if the state requires all applicants to take an oath to
defend the constitution of that state. This was a five-four decision,
with a strong dissent 68 by Mr. Justice Black on the grounds that
a man was being denied his religious liberty.
Whether the dissent would have been as strong if it were a Communist that was being deprived of the privilege is a matter of conjecture. The Court in dealing with the non-Communist oath of the
Taft-Hartley Act, declared that Congress could reasonably find that
the Communist is not a proper person to be a leader in a union
which is to have the privilege of being an exclusive bargaining agent. 69
Justice Jackson in the same case, in a concurring opinion, 70 declared
62
63

In re Taylor, 309 Ky. 388, 217 S. W. (2d) 954 (1949).

See, e.g., Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U. S. 540, 541, 45 S. Ct. 399, 69 L. Ed.
775 (1925).
64 Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366 (U. S. 1867).
65

See note 36 supra.
American Communications Ass'n C. I. 0. et al. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382,
413, 70 S. Ct. 674, 94 L. Ed. 925 (1950).
67 In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561, 65 S. Ct. 1307, 89 L. Ed. 1795 (1945).
68 Id., 325 U. S. at 573.
69 American Comqiunications Ass'n C. I. 0. et al. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382,
70 S. Ct. 674, 94 L. Ed. 597 (1950).
70 Id., 339 U. S. at 422.
66
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that Communism is more than a mere matter of belief; it is a dynamic
force which seeks a world revolution by force and violence if necessary.
The Communist himself is the implement by which this end is to be
obtained. If Congress has the power to condition any right or privilege of an American citizen by oath it certainly could act in this
instance.
Conclusion
On this authority then, it appears that state action against Communists in the practice of law should be held reasonable. The practice of law does not exist for the purpose of a world revolution, and
the use of the privilege to abuse the courts and ridicule justice is
not proper. The position of a lawyer, whose function is to serve the
courts and preserve their dignity, when held by a Communist becomes a dangerous weapon in the hands of an organization whose
aims and ideals are incompatible with democratic government. It is
reasonable, then, to deny that weapon to that organization. As stated
by the Canadian court: 71
S.. the principles of constitutional democracy upon which free society
is established, cannot be based upon pragmatic values, determinable by
circumstances and consequently variable. They must be based on certain absolute values, justice, truth and reason. That is why inalienable
rights were written into the United States Constitution. That is why
we have Magna Carta. Hence freedom of expression must have some
limitations-it cannot be used to destroy our free society, to destroy
democracy itself. Freedom of expression cannot be given to Communists
to permit them to use it to destroy our constitutional liberties, by first
poisoning the minds of the young, the impressionable, and irresponsible.
Freedom of expression is not a freedom to destroy freedom.

Sidney Baker
Maurice J. Moriarty

Taxation
INCOME TAX EVASION

In order that a taxpayer may not mistake his duty, the Internal
Revenue Code is greatly detailed with respect to what is taxable income. Nevertheless, his right to plan his transactions and carry them
out in a manner most advantageous, tax-wise, to himself is recognized.
The exercise of the right is "avoidance," which must be within the*
terms of the code, regulations, and their interpretations. The particular method of avoidance may, of course, be questioned by the Bureau,
71 Martin v. The Law Society, [1950] 3 D. L. R. 173 (B. C. Ct. of App.).
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necessitating interpretation of the statute. Unfortunately, the permissible end of lowering taxes is frequently sought through illegal means.
This is evasion. Unlike avoidance, it is a shirking of one's duty to the
Government. Just as Congress has specifically provided for the production of revenue, it has also provided for the disposition and punishment of evaders.
While the penal provisions themselves are clear, the type of illegal
activity to which they apply is not. Evasion may take the form of
criminal fraud, civil fraud, or negligence. Where criminal fraud is
found, it may be either a felony or a misdemeanor. Where no crime
is found, the act may be fraudulent or negligent.
I.
Preliminary Considerations
The Internal Revenue Code provides that a wilful attempt to evade
or defeat the tax is a felony punishable by a fine of ten thousand dollars, and/or imprisonment for not more than five years.' This penalty
also applies to any person who wilfully aids, assists, procures, counsels,
or advisesi the preparation of a false or fraudulent return under the
internal revenue laws, whether or not the person authorized or required to present the return has knowledge of or consents to the misstatement. 2 A wilful failure to pay the tax, to make a return, or to
keep records and supply information as required by the Code and the
regulations, is a misdemeanor punishable by fine of ten thousand dollars and/or imprisonment for not more than one year.3
The Code also contains civil sanctions. A fifty percent penalty is
assessed when any part of a deficiency is caused by fraud with intent
to evade tax.4 But if a deficiency is due to negligence or intentional
disregard of rules and regulations without, intent to defraud, five percent of the total amount of the deficiency, in addition to the deficiency,
is assessed.5 A five percent penalty is imposed for any failure to make
and file a return required by the internal revenue laws. It increases
five percent every thirty days from the date of failure, to a maximum
of twenty-five percent; 6 this is in addition to the fraud or negligence
penalties where these are applicable. 7
1
2

INT. REV. CODE § 145(b).
INT. REV. CODE § 3793(b)(1).

3
4

INT. REV. CODE § 145(a).
INT. REv. CODE § 293(b).

Comparable penalties are found in § 1019(b),
for the gift tax and in § 3612(d) (2), for all other taxes.
5 INT. Rxv. CODE § 293(a). Minor exceptions to the negligence lenalty are
found in §§ 272(i), 292.
6 INT. REV. CODE § 291.

7 Roerich v. Helvering, 115 F. (2d) 39 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 312 U. S.
700, 61 S. Ct. 740, 85 L. Ed. 1134 (1940). The taxpayer is also liable for six
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Limitation of Actions:
The imposition of these penalties is subject to statutes of limitations.
There is a six-year period of limitations applicable to felonies,8 while
the penalty imposed for a misdemeanor under Section 145(b) is subject to a three year period of limitations. 9 These statutes begin to
run when the wilfulness occurs.10 In instances of civil fraud, negligence, or simple deficiency, an action may be brought by the Government at any time."1

Buarden of Proof:
Crime or fraud is not presumed. Rather, the taxpayer is deemed
to act in good faith in his dealings with the Government and the
burden of proof lies with the Commissioner.' 2 For criminal fraud, like
all other criminal actions, the Commissioner has the burden of proving
the guilt of the taxpayer beyond a reasonable doubt.' 3 But in so
doing, he does not have to prove an evasion of the whole deficiency
charged in the indictment; the proof is sufficient if it shows "any
4
substantial portion" of the tax liability to have been wilfully evaded.'
In a civil action a mere preponderance of evidence is insufficient to
prove tax fraud.' 5 The Commissioner must establish his case by
clear and convincing proof.' 6
percent annual interest on any deficiency, regardless of the reason for the deficiency, INT. REV. CODE § 292; in addition, the expense of detection and punishment of fraud may be assessed, INT. REV. CODE § 3792.
8 INT. Rxv. CODE §§ 3748(a) (2), (3).
9 INT. REv. CODE § 3748(a).
10 Capone v. United States, 51 F. (2d) 609 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.

S. 669, 52 S. Ct. 44, 76 L. Ed. 566 (1931); Arnold v. United States, 75 F. (2d)
144 (9th Cir. 1935).
11 INT. REv. CODE § 276(a). In these situations it is considered that a false,
fraudulent, or deficient "return" is no return at all; hence, a statute of limitations
could not begin to run. Duncan C. McCrea, P-H 1948 TC Mixa. DEC. f1 48,159
(1948), aff'd, 184 F. (2d) 842 (6th Cir. 1950); Demos Mandis, P-H 1950 TC
Mb . DEc. ff 50,149 (1950).
12 INT. REV. CODE § 1112; George L. Rickard, 15 B. T. A. 316 (1929).

This
burden was placed upon the Commissioner in Section 601 of the Revenue Act of
1928.

45 STAT. 872 (1928).

13 United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 54 S. Ct. 223, 78 L. Ed. 381
(1933); Paddock v. United States, 79 F. (2d) 872 (9th Cir. 1935).
14 Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F. (2d) 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U. S. 860, 70 S. Ct. 103, 94 L. Ed. 527 (1949); United States v. Rosenblum,
176 F. (2d) 321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 893, 70 S. Ct. 239, 94 L. Ed.
548 (1949); Cave v. United States, 159 F. (2d) 464 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 331
U. S. 847, 67 S. Ct. 1732, 91 L. Ed. 1856 (1947); Tinkoff v. United States, 86
F. (2d) 868 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 301 U. S. 689, 57 S. Ct. 795, 81 L. Ed.
1346 (1937). United States v. Koppelman, 61 F. Supp. 1007 (M.D. Pa. 1945)
($12,000 omitted from a $3,500,000 partnership not substantial). What constitutes a "substantial portion" will vary with the individual case.
15 Estate of James H. Snowden, P-H 1947 TC MExr. Dwc. ff 47,231 (1947).
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What amounts to clear and convincing proof is not susceptible to
facile definition. In one case the Commissioner was required to submit evidence to prove that fraud existed even though the taxpayer
offered no evidence whatsoever and, in fact, did not appear.17 Yet, in
other cases it was held that the Commissioner had sustained the burden of proof where there was a showing of a failure to report income
without a reasonable excuse.' 8 The burden of proof is not necessarily
a positive one. For example, a failure to testify has been held to
create a presumption of fraud. 19 Where deficiencies are "too many,
too varied, too continuous and too excessive to be plausibly attributed
to inadvertence or carelessness . . ." 20 the Government has demonstrably proved its case clearly and convincingly.
Methods of Detection:
Since a fraudulent deficiency can seldom be established by direct
proof when income is concealed, 2 ' the Bureau must prove the amount
by approximation. The two most common methods used by the Bureau
are the "analysis of bank deposits" method and the "net worth" method. Under the former, the taxpayer's bank statements are examined
in order to determine his approximate income. If no adequate explanation is offered of the source of the deposits, their total may be
treated as income.2 2 Under the net worth method the Bureau reconstructs the net worth of the taxpayer at the beginning and end of the
year in question, treating the increase in net worth, plus the taxpayer's
16 Griffiths v. Commissioner, 50 F. (2d) 782 (7th Cir. 1931); A. W. Mellon,
36 B.T.A. 977 (1937); Joseph Talbot, P-H 1950 TC MEw. Dxc. fT50,179 (1950);
Estate of Fred Arbogast, P-H 1948 TC MEr. Dxc. ff 48,047 (1948); Ellwood M.
Rabenold, P-H 1947 TC Mpm. DEc. ff 47,250 (1947).
17 Miller-Pocahontas Coal Co., 21 B. T. A. 1360 (1931).
18 Rogers v. Commissioner, 111 F. (2d) 987 (6th Cir. 1940); A. Harry
Wyman, P-H 1950 TC MEm. DEc. f1 50,172 (1950); Florian J. Bryloski, P-H
1949 TC MEm. DEc. ff 49,222 (1949); Joseph S. Loparo, P-H 1949 TC MEMx.
DEc.1 49,214 (1949).
19 Max Cohen, 9 T. C. 1156 (1947); Wichita Terminal Elevator Co., 6 T. C.
1158 (1946).
20 Halle v. Commissioner, 175 F. (2d) 500, 503 (2d Cir. 1949).
21 Myres v. United States, 174 F. (2d) 329 (8th Cir. 1949); Paschen v.
United States, 70 F. (2d) 491 (7th Cir. 1934); United States v. Commerford, 64
F. (2d) 28 (2d Cir. 1933).
22 Chadick v. United States, 77 F. (2d) 961 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 296
U. S. 609, 56 S. Ct. 126, 80 L. Ed. 432 (1935); Guzik v. United States, 54 F.
(2d) 618 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U. S. 545, 52 S. Ct. 395, 76 L. Ed. 937
(1932) (taxpayer reported $60,240 as against $1,044,353 determined by the Commissioner); Halle v. Commissioner, 175 F. (2d) 500 (2d Cir. 1949); Arthur M.
Slavin, 43 B. T. A. 1100 (1941), aff'd, 129 F. (2d) 325 (8th Cir. 1942); Russell
C. Mauch, 35 B. T. A. 617 (1937), aff'd, 113 F. (2d) 555 (3rd Cir. 1940); Leonard B. Willits, 36 B. T. A. 294 (1937). But cf. C. J. Kowkabany, P-H 1949 TC
MEm. Dxc. f[49,191 (1949), where petitioner's determination of income was sustained over the Bureau's after accountants spent 1400 man hours in making the
determination; William Neth, P-H 1949 TC MEm. DEc. IT49,012 (1949).
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living expenses, as income.2 3 The taxpayer then has the burden of
rebutting the presumption that the Government's determination is
correct.

24

Where the nature of the taxpayer's business permitted, the Bureau
has added the taxpayer's average mark-up to his purchases to arrive
at gross sales in the reconstruction of a profit and loss statement. 25
Another method used is to introduce testimony by witnesses with the
same occupation as the taxpayer. 26 The income of an individual also
may be approximated by totaling expenditures where the source of
the funds used is unexplained. 27 Frequently more than one of the
foregoing methods are used in the same investigation.28 However,
the method of detection used must be that which clearly reflects the
taxpayer's income; 20 if the Commissioner's determination is arbitrary
30
or unreasonable, the courts will set it aside.
II.
Criminal Fraud
Fraud is defined by Webster as an intentional perversion of the
truth for the purpose of obtaining some valuable thing or promise
from another. However, exactly what constitutes criminal fraud is
not so clear. At least this much is discernible from the Internal Rev23 Frank M. Wiseley, 13 T. C. 253 (1949), whereothe Commissioner used
bank records, mortgage records, etc., consulted with taxpayer's accountant, and
determined that the taxpayer had a net worth of $46,774 at the beginning of the
year and $63,578 at the end. From this increase in net worth $1686 was subtracted as allowable deductions, and $3600 was added as living expenses to arrive
at net income. See also United States v. Chapman, 168 F. (2d) 997 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 335 U. S. 853, 69 S. Ct. 82, 93 L. Ed. 401 (1948); Kenney v. Commissioner, 111 F. (2d) 374 (5th Cir. 1940).
24 Halle v. Commissioner, 175 F. (2d) 500 (2d Cir. 1949); Sherman F. Little, P-H 1947 TC MEm. DEc. ff47,291 (1947).
25 T. F. Green, P-H 1948 TC MEm. DEc. ff 48,054 (1948) (Commissioner
used an average mark-up of 33-1/3 percent).
26 Roberts v. Commissioner, 176 F. (2d) 221 (9th Cir. 1949); Cesanelli v.
Commissioner, 8 T. C. 776 (1947) (ten percent of sales was a fair estimate of
tips received by a water).
27 Max Cohen, 9 T. C. 1156 (1947) (sums expended for personal use or investment during the year, after the elimination of known non-income sources of
the funds invested, were treated as income). See also G. A. Comeaux, 10 T. C.
201 (1948); Robert L. Carnahan, 9 T. C. 1206 (1947).
28 Everett M. Bratcher, P-H 1949 TC BME_.DEc. ff 49,158 (1949) (bank
account and personal expenses); William Neth, P-H 1949 TC MEW. DEc. f[ 49,012
(1949); T. M. Stanton, P-H 1947 TC MEm. DEc. ff 47,251 (1947).
29 INT. REv. CODE § 41; James T. Bennett, P-H 1950 TC MEm. DEc.
150,027 (1950) (net worth method approved).
30 Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U. S. 507, 55 S. Ct. 287, 79 L. Ed. 623 (1935)
(amount was susceptible of correct determination); National Lumber & Tie Co.
v. Commissioner, 90 F. (2d) 216 (8th Cir. 1937) (but the taxpayer's evidence was
insufficient to establish the correct charge).
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enue Code: 31 in order for the tax fraud to be criminal, either as a
misdemeanor or a felony, the acts of the taxpayer must have been
"wilful." This word usually connotes an act which is intentional or
voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. It has been said that
"wilful" conduct, when used in a criminal statute: 32
. . . generally means an act done with a bad purpose; without justifiable excuse; . . . stubbornly, obstinately, perversely; . . . without
ground for believing it is lawful, or conduct marked by careless disregard
whether or not one has the right so to act.

In determining whether the crime is a felony or a misdemeanor,
recourse to the statute is of little avail. Section 145(a) states that
"wilful failure" to do certain acts is a misdemeanor, while Section
145(b) declares a felony to be a "wilful attempt" to evade or defeat
the tax. 33 Theoretically at least, a distinction can be made on the
basis that Congress has provided for a more severe punishment for the
one act than for the other. It is contended that such a manifestation
should not go for aught.3 4 A more practical basis, however, is that
in order for an act of criminal fraud to be a felony, the taxpayer must
perform some affirmative act or acts. 3 5 Passive neglect of the statute,
even though it is "wilful," is only a misdemeanor.386
An important aspect of this distinction is that an individual may be
37 in order to be
38
prosecuted for a felony, tax liability must be alleged and proved.

guilty of a misdemeanor even though he owes no tax;

Merely because an ,attempt to evade the tax is unsuccessful does not
31

INT. REv. CoDE §§ 145(a), (b).

United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 394, 54 S. Ct. 223, 78 L. Ed.
381 (1933); United States v. Venuto, 182 F. (2d) 519 (3rd Cir. 1950); Buttermore v. United States, 180 F. (2d) 853 (6th Cir. 1950); Batt*s v. United States,
172 F. (2d) 1 (6th Cir. 1949).
33 INT. REv. CoDE §§ 145(a), (b).
34 Jones v. United States, 164 F. (2d) 398 (5th Cir. 1947). In employing
the word "attempt" to embrace the gravest of offenses against the revenue laws,
Congress intended some wilful commission in addition to the wilful omission that
makes up the test of a misdemeanor.
35 Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492, 63 S. Ct. 364, 87 L. Ed. 418 (1943);
United States v. Capone, 93 F. (2d) 840 (7th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U. S.
651, 58 S. Ct. 750, 82 L. Ed. 1112 (1938).
36 Cave v. United States, 159 F. (2d) 464 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U. S.
847, 67 S. Ct. 1732, 91 L. Ed. 1856 (1947). While the failure to file a return
constitutes an omission, and is therefore only a misdemeanor, the omission of
income from a return which -has been filed is treated as a commission, and therefore constitutes a felony.
37 O'Brien v. United States, 51 F. (2d) 193 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 284
U. S. 673, 52 S. Ct. 129, 76 L. Ed. 569 (1931). See Spies v. United States, 317
U. S. 492, 63 S. Ct. 364, 87 L. Ed.41& (1943).
38 Rose v. United States, 128 F. (2d) 622 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U. S. 651, 63 S. Ct. 47, 87 L. Ed. 524 (1942); United States v. Schenck, 126 F.
(2d) 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. Moskowitz, 316 U. S.
705, 62 S. Ct. 1309, 86 L. Ed. 1773 (1942); Paschen v. United States, 70 F. (2d)
491 (7th Cir. 1934).
32
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relieve the taxpayer from prosecution under Section 145(b). The
felony is complete when the taxpayer wilfully and knowingly files a
fraudulent return with intent to evade any part of the tax due.3 9 For
the same reason, an assessment of a deficiency is not necessary to a
criminal prosecution for wilful attempt to defeat and evade the income tax. 40 Contrawise, criminal prosecution does not relieve the
taxpayer from civil penalties, 41 nor does payment of the civil penalty
42
bar a criminal action.
Those acts which constitute a misdemeanor are wilful failure to file
a return,4 3 wilful failure to pay the tax,4 and wilful failure to keep
records and supply information as required by law or regulations. 45
While the Code specifies what conduct constitutes a misdemeanor, no
such limitation is made with respect to felonious actions. The scope
of the statute was intimated in the case of Spies v. United States,4 6
where the court said:
By way of illustration, and not by way of limitation, we would think
affirmative willful attempt may be inferred from conduct such as keeping
a double set of books, making false entries or alterations, or false invoices
or documents, destruction of books or records, concealment of assets or
covering up sources of income, handling of one's affairs to avoid making
the records usual in transactions of the kind, and any conduct, the likely
effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal.

This enumeration is by no means an exaggeration. 4 7

39 Guzik v. United States, 54 F. (2d) 618 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 285
U. S. 545, 52 S. Ct. 395, 76 L. Ed. 937 (1932); United States v. Croessant, 178
F. (2d) 96 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 927, 70 S. Ct. 626, 94 L. Ed. 1348
(1949).
40 United States v. Commerford, 64 F. (2d) 28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 289
U. S. 759, 53 S. Ct. 792, 77 L. Ed. 1502 (1933); Guzik v. United States, supra
note 39.
41 Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492, 63 S. Ct. 364, 87 L. Ed. 418 (1943);
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 58 S. Ct. 630, 82 L. Ed. 917 (1938); John
R. Hanby, 26 B. T. A. 670 (1932), aff'd, 67 F. (2d) 125 (4th Cir. 1933).
42 United States v. McCormick, 67 F. (2d) 867 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 291
U. S. 662, 54 S. Ct. 438, 78 L. Ed. 1054 (1934); Slick v. United States, 1 F.
(2d) 897 (7th Cir. 1924); United States v. LaFontaine, 54 F. (2d) 371 (D. Md.
1931).
43 INT. REv. CODE § 145(a); Bowles v. United States, 73 F. (2d) 772 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 294 U. S. 710, 55 S. Ct. 506, 79 L. Ed. 1245 (1934); O'Brien
v. United States, 51 F. (2d) 193 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 673, 52 S. Ct.
129, 76 L. Ed. 569 (1931); United States v. Miro, 60 F. (2d) 58 (2d Cir. 1932).
44 United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 54 S. Ct. 223, 78 L. Ed. 381
(1933); United States v. McCormick, 67 F. (2d) 867 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied,
291 U. S. 662, 54 S. Ct. 438, 78 L. Ed. 1054 (1934); United States v. Commerford, 64 F. (2d) 28 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U. S. 759, 53 S. Ct. 792, 77 L. Ed.
1502 (1933); United States v. Schuermann, 79 F. Supp. 247 (E. D. Mo. 1948),
aftd, 174 F. (2d) 397 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 831, 70 S. Ct. 69, 94
L. Ed. 46 (1949); United States v. Sullivan, 98 F. (2d) 79 (2d Cir. 1938).
45 INT. REv. CODE § 145(a).
45 Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492, 499, 63 S. Ct. 364, 87 L. Ed. 418
(1943).
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III.
Civil Fraud
The majority of tax fraud cases are civil rather than criminal. The
Internal Revenue Code provides for a fifty percent penalty where any
part of the deficiency "is due to fraud with the intent to evade tax." 48
Neither the income tax regulations nor the Tax Court have defined
this phrase. Nor have they specifically stated what characteristics are
essential to constitute civil fraud. Perhaps, an exact definition would
defeat the purpose of the statute, since the variety of situations from
which civil fraud could arise are, like criminal fraud, practically limitless. Any limitation by definition, then, would leave a fertile field
for tax avoidance outside the exact limits specified. What is civil fraud
can best be said to depend upon the particular situation.
While discussing these situations it must be kept in mind that, as
previously pointed out, the Commissioner has the burden of proving
that a deficiency is due to fraud, whether it be criminal or civil. 49
47 See e.g., United States v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513, 62 S. Ct. 344, 86 L. Ed.
383 (1941) (failure to keep records usual for similar transactions) ; United States
v. Rosenblum, 176 F. (2d) 321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 893, 70 S. Ct.
239, 94 L. Ed. 548 (1949) (concealment of income obtained from sale of whiskey
above ceiling prices); Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F. (2d) 924 (9th Cir),
cert. denied, 338 U. S. 860, 70 S. Ct. 103, 94 L. Ed. 527 (1949) (failure to report
income from sale of meat above ceiling prices); United States v. Chapman, 168
F. (2d) 997 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 853, 69 S. Ct. 82, 93 L. Ed. 401
(1948) (concealment of assets from the sale of meat at overceiling prices) ; Locke
v. United States, 166 F. (2d) 449 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 837, 68 S. Ct.
1495, 92 L. Ed. 1763 (1948) (formation of alleged partnerships, trusts, and purported corporations for the purpose of evading income tax); Steinberg v. United
States, 162 F. (2d) 120 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 808, 68 S. Ct. 108, 92
L. Ed. 386 (1947) (filing false and fraudulent tax returns); Maxfield et al. v.
United States, 152 F. (2d) 593 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 327 U. S. 794, 66 S. Ot.
821, 90 L. Ed. 1021 (1946) (special set of books kept for exhibition purposes);
Shinyu Nor et al. v. United States, 148 F. (2d) 696 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U. S. 720, 66 S. Ct. 25, 90 L. Ed. 426 (1945) (one set of books kept in English
and another in Japanese); Garland v. United States, 182 F. (2d) 801 (4th Cir.
1950); Buttermore v. United States, 180 F. (2d) 853 (6th Cir. 1950) (covering
up sources of income) ; Jelaza v. United States, 179 F. (2d) 202 (4th Cir. 1950) ;
Lurding v. United States, 179 F. (2d) 419 (6th Cir. 1950) (signing a false return
made by an accountant for the taxpayer); Gaunt v. United States, 184 F. (2d)
284 (1st Cir. 1950) (filing a false and fraudulent return); United States v. Potson, 171 F. (2d) 495 (7th Cir. 1948) (concealment of gambling winnings); United
States v. Lange, 161 F. (2d) 699 (7th Cir. 1947) (taxpayer made false entries,
alterations and invoices); Yoffe v. United States, 153 F. (2d) 570 (1st Cir. 1946)
(destruction of books and records); United States v. Vassallo, 4 P-H 1950 Fan.
TAX SERv. ff 72,583 (D. Del. 1949) (concealment of assets); United States v.
Parker, 4 P-H 1950 FED. TAx SERv. f 72,556 (M. D. N. C. 1949) (concealment of
sources of income).
48

49

1949).

INT. REv. CoDE § 293(b).
INT. REv. ConE § 1112; Harris v. Commissioner, 174 F. (2d) 70 (4th Cir.

NOTES
But the Commissioner's determination of the existence and amount of
the deficiency has the support of a presumption of correctness. 50
The taxpayer then has the burden of rebutting his determination; however, his failure to do so raises no presumption of fraud. 51
A common source of an assessment for a deficiency is the failure
to file a return. Frequently, failure to file is fraudulent, and the fifty
percent fraud penalty, as well as the five to twenty-five percent penalty
for failure to file, 52 is imposed. 53 However, fraud is not necessarily
present in such a case 54-the taxpayer may have believed his income
was insufficient to require filing.
A determination of "an intent to evade the tax"-which can exist
only in the taxpayer's mind-is practically impossible to prove directly; most often it must be inferred from circumstantial evidence. 5 5
For example, where the Government proved that receipts were substantial and the taxpayer offered only flimsy reasons for his delinquency,
the situation constituted "affirmative and convincing evidence that
such failure was fraudulent." 56
The Commissioner has a strong case of civil fraud where the taxpayer files a return and specifically omits an income producing transaction. 57 Of course, no civil fraud penalty will accrue where the taxpayer has made no attempt to conceal the transaction; 58 or where
he has made an innocent 59 or honest 9o mistake; or where he has
reasonably considered an exchange to be non-taxable.6 1 One who
50 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111, 54 S. Ct. 8, 78 L. Ed. 2,12 (1933);
Commissioner v. Volunteer State Life Insurance Co., 110 F. (2d) 879 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 310 U. S. 636, 60 S. Ct. 1080, 84 L. Ed. 1405 (1940); John Kehoe,
34 B. T. A. 59 (1936); John Kennedy, 16 B. T. A. 1372 (1929) (negligence).
51 Arthur M. Godwin, 34 B. T. A. 485 (1936); A. W. Minyard, P-H 1947
TC MEm. DEC. f[47,283 (1947).
52 INT. REv. CODE § 291.
53
Roerich v. Helvering, 115 F. (2d) 39 (D. C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
312 U. S. 700, 61 S. Ct. 740, 85 L. Ed. 1134 (1941); James T. Bennett, P-H
1950 TC MEir. DEC. ff 50,027 (1950) (gambler's failure to report income or keep
records prompted by the illegal nature of his chosen profession).
54 W. L. Harris, P-H 1948 TC MLxm. DEC. f[48,235 (1948).
55 See J. William Schultze, 18 B. T. A. 444 (1929).
56 Robert G. Tyson, P-H 1950 TC M
u. DEC. ff 50,060 (1950).
57 George J. Klevenhagen, P-H 1950 TC MEm. DEC. II 50,120 (1950). Where
the taxpayer failed to report a sale of slot machines because, as hie testified, he
thought they had been fully depreciated. The court accepted his testimony,
which made the basis of the assets zero, and held the entire sales price to be
income. C.R. Rich, 6 B. T. A. 822 (1927).
58 National Land Co., 10 B. T. A. 527 (1928).
59 William W. Kellett, 5 T. C. 608 (1945).
60 Earl H. Snow, P-H 1949 TC MEow. DEC. f1 49,180 (1949) (incompetence
in the handling and keeping of books); John E. Hoover, P-H 1945 TC MEM.
DEC. ff 45,193 (1945) (ignorance of the law).
61 Bronson v. Commissioner, 183 F. (2d) 529 (2d Cir. 1950) (taxpayer's
view of the law was erroneous, but reasonable).
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positively conceals illegal income has little chance of escaping the fraud
penalty. 62 The fact that concealed income was illegally obtained,
while not conclusive of the fact of fraud, may influence the court adversely, 63 but the fact alone is insufficient to raise a presumption of
intent to evade. 64 The fraud penalty more likely will be imposed if
65
the court finds a gross understatement of income.
While failure to file a return, or omission of an income producing
transaction, may constitute civil fraud, a clearer case is presented
where there is a deliberate omission of income with full realization of
tax consequences. 66 A patently lame and untenable excuse for failure
67
to report income has been in itself evidence of a fraudulent purpose.
68
The nature of excessive deductions may also suggest that purpose.
The basis of a deliberate omission may be the keeping of false records.
A fraud case is made out where fictitious records are proved to have
69
been kept, and the return is proved to have been based on them.
records
business
an
individual's
when
There is a more difficult case
are only inaccurate or inadequate. While a strong suspicion of vincible
ignorance or of guilty knowledge may be created by this, it is not
sufficient as proof of fraud; 70 however, a consideration of the surrounding circumstances may prompt the court to find more than mere
negligence. 71 Reporting fictitious transactions is72 in itself evidence of
bad faith and a fraudulent intent to evade tax.

62 See Heyman v. Commissioner, 176 F. (2d) 389 (2d Cir. 1949), cert.
338 U. S. 904, 70 S. Ct. 306, 94 L. Ed. 557 (1950).
63 See Estate of Nitto, 13 T. C. 858 (1949) (omission of extortion receipts);
Gust Pouroudis, P-H 1950 TO MEm. Dxc. 50,031 (1950).
64 Frank J. Moore, 37 B. T. A. 378 (1938) (gambler); J. William Schultze,
18 B. T. A. 444 (1929) (bootlegger).
65 Frank A. Weinstein, 33 B. T. A. 105 (1935) (return so incorrect as to
compel a conclusion of deliberate falsity); Edward Wall, P-H 1950 TC MEm.
DEc. f 50,103 (1950) (income understated by almost 100 percent with no plausible explanation).
DEc. f1 50,165 (1950).
66 George Herberger, P-H 1950 TC MEx.
67 Bennie Wolf, P-H 1950 TC Mxm. Dc. f1 50,254 (1950). But cf. Mitchell
v. Commissioner, 118 F. (2d) 308 (5th Cir. 1941); James Nicholson, 32 B. T. A.
977, aff'd, 90 F. (2d) 978 (8th Cir. 1937).
14.130
68 Joseph H. Imeson, 14 T. C. 1151, P-H 1950 TC Rw. Dc.
(1950) (cost of extensive pleasure trips reported as traveling expense).
69 William Wiener, 12 T. C. 701 (1949) (two sets of books kept, tax return
based on false set); Florian J. Brylaski, P-H 1949 TC MEm. DEc. ff 49,222
(1949).
70 Walter M. Ferguson, 14 T. C. 846, P-H 1950 TC REP. Dc. f 14.103
(1950) (errors due to carelessness).
71 A. Brigham Rose, P-H 1949 TC MEm. Dc. 49,005 (1949).
72 Henry H. Schallman, B. T. A. MEm. DEc. ff 36,242, dismissed, 34 B. T. A.
1313 (1936), aff'd, 102 F. (2d) 1013 (6th Cir. 1939); Harry F. Canelo, 41 B. T.
A. 713 (1940); D. C. Clarke, 22 B. T. A. 314 (1931); Max Freifeld, P-H 1949
TC MEm. Dc. 1149,018 (1949).

denied,

NOTES
In any of the above instances, if a joint return were filed, both taxpayers would be liable for the civil penalty, though the fraudulent intent of only one party is proved. 7 3 The rationale of this is the statutory provision holding the parties to a joint return jointly and severally liable for the tax.74 Also,. the penalty provisions themselves provide that the penalties are to be collected as part of the tax.75 However, where a wife has a community interest in unreported income of a
business, the fraudulent intent to evade taxes is not necessarily im76
puted to her.
Ordinarily in civil actions a principal is liable for the acts of his
agent if committed in the course of his employment and within the
scope of his authority; for a principal to be liable for the civil fraud
penalty, he must have an intent to evade the tax. 7 7 The requisite
intent on his part may not be present where he has acted with the
advice of a lawyer or an accountant. 78 Where the taxpayer acts on
the advice of reputable counsel, he should not be held guilty of
fraud 79-indeed, the very fact that he seeks advice should indicate
that he is acting in good faith 8 0-but he cannot fully escape liability
by simply entrusting the making of his return to another. He will be
liable, for example, where he has knowledge of an understatement of
income; 8 1 likewise, if he signs a return which he should have known
to be false.8 2 Where a taxpayer mistakenly hired a dishonest tax
the taxpayer having seen or
consultant, who filed the return without
83
signed it, no penalty was imposed.
73 Howell v. Commissioner, 175 F. (2d) 240 (6th Cir. 1949) (wife had
signed); Roe Ziller, P-H 1948 TC MEM. DEc. f1 48,227 (1948) (wife was negligent).
74 INT. REv. Con § 51(b).
75 See INT. Rxv. CODE § 293(a): the penalty "shall be assessed, collected, and
paid in the same manner as if it were a deficiency. .. "
76 George Herberger, P-H 1950 TC MEm. DEc. ff 50,165 (1950).
77 INT. Rav. CoDE § 293(b); George W. Schoenhut, 45 B. T. A. 812 (1941).
78 Davis et ux. v. Commissioner, 184 F. (2d) 86 (10th Cir. 1950), (excessive depreciation computed by accountant); Rogers Recreation Co. of Connecticut v. Commissioner, 103 F. (2d) 780 (2d Cir. 1939) (honest erroneous deduction); Jemison v. Commissioner, 45 F. (2d) 4 (5th Cir. 1930).
79 Briggs-Weaver Machinery Co., 14 B. T. A. 1351 (1929).
But cf. William F. Pohlen, P-H 1947 TC MEm. DEc. ff 47,056 (1947), where the court said,
"Taxpayers must, of course, assume responsibility for their returns even though
they employ others t6 prepare them."
80 C. R. Lindbach Foundation, 4 T. C. 652, aff'd, 150 F. (2d) 986 (3rd
Cir. 1945).
81 Wickham v. Commissioner, 65 F. (2d) 527 (8th Cir. 1933).
82 Joseph H. Imeson, 14 T. C. 1151, P-H 1950 TC REP. DEc. ff 14.130 (1950).
Here the deductions were obviously false but the taxpayer hoped to protect himself by accepting the opinion of a tax "expert."
The tax
83 Dale R. Fulton, P-H 1950 TC REP. DEc. 1 14.169 (195D).
"expert" in this case was the same dishonest one employed by Imeson, upon
whom the penalty was imposed. See note 82 supra.
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The poet who said: 84
I want men to remember
When gray Death sets me free
can rest assured the tax collector will grant his wish-it is well settled
that the civil fraud penalty survives death. It may be assessed and
approved subsequent to the taxpayer's death.8 5
IV.
Negligence
"Negligence" (not here used in the technical sense of the law of
Torts), like civil fraud, is a broad term difficult to define for practical
tax purposes, although a definition has been attempted by the
Bureau: 86
... Negligence is attributable to the taxpayer if he computes the tax in
disregard of the instructions on the return form or otherwise incorrectly,
unless he can show that his error was due to an honest misunderstanding
of the facts or the law of which an average reasonable man might be
capable....
This section places upon the taxpayer the duty of knowing and understanding such parts of the regulations as are applicable to the submission
of his return....

Section 293 (a) concerns deficiencies emanating from negligence and
intentional disregard of rules and regulations without fraudulent inintent.8 7 Fraud and negligence penalties cannot be applied to the
same deficiency. 88 The two embrace the same act, but in fraud there
is an "intent to evade" while in negligence there is not. Consequently,
the terms are mutually exclusive. Unlike criminal or civil fraud, where
the Commissioner assesses a negligence penalty he is presumed to be
correct; to escape the penalty the taxpayer must prove that the deficiency was not caused by his negligence.8 9
84 John Bennett, I Want an Epitaph in BARTLrr, FA mIAx QUOTATIONS
774 (11th ed. 1938).
85 Helvering v, Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 58 S. Ct. 630, 82 L. Ed. 917 (1938);
Reimer's Estate v. Commissioner, 180 F. (2d) 159 (6th Cir. 1950); Kirk v. Commissioner, 179 F. (2d) 619 (1st Cir. 1950).
Query: Is not a reas86 1919-20: A. R. M. 23, 2 Cum. BuLL. 231 (1920).
onable man capable of misunderstanding the bulk of the tax statutes?
8
INT. REv. Cona § 293(a).
Frequently the Commis88 1919-20: 0.1028, 2 Cum. Bu-L. 233 (1920).
sioner pleads negligence as an alternative to fraud. See Lucian T. Wilcox, 44
B. T. A. 373 (1941); L. E. Meraux, 38 B. T. A. 200 (1938); Watson-Moore
Co., 30 B. T. A. 1197 (1934).
89 Anne Humphrey, P-H 1946 TC MEM. Dxc. ff 46,004 (1946), aff'd sub.
Humphrey v. Commissioner, 162 F. (2d) 853 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332
noma.
U.S. 817, 68 S. Ct. 157, 92 L. Ed. 394 (1947); W. R. Davis, P-H 1948 TC
MEm. DEc. ff 48,089 (1948); Charles Goodman et al., P-H 1946 TC MEM. DEc.
g 46,300 (1946). But ef. Bruce E. and Katherine Gentry, P-H 1951 TC Mxm.

NOTES
The courts have not been as ready to find negligence as the Commissioner has under the regulation cited above. 90 In R. Shad Bennett,9 1 the Tax Court sustained the Commissioner in finding negligence for the failure to keep books and records which would properly
reflect profit and loss. The court of appeals reversed this decision
saying: 92
A finding that the return is incorrect, or that the taxpayer did not
keep proper or complete books of account, or that his calculations are
confusing is not enough [to sustain the negligence penalty]....

The Commissioner's allegations of negligence were refuted when the
deficiency was declared to be due to accident, 93 clerical error, 94 honest
difference of opinion, 95 honest doubt as to taxability of an item, 96 and
honest mistake.9 7 In contrast, the negligence penalty has been imposed
for omissions from income without plausible explanation;

98

for omis-

sions of transactions of sale; 99 for the failure to keep adequate, proper
and sufficient records;' 00 and for overstating deductions.' 0 '

DEc. ff 51,034 (1951) (negligence penalty was imposed by the court where the
taxpayer's pleadings merely failed to allege error).
90 1919-20: A. R. M. 23, 2 Cum. BuLL. 231 (1920).
91 P-H 1942 TC MEm. DEc. [42,576 (1942).
92 Bennett et ux. v. Commissioner, 139 F. (2d) 961, 966 (8th Cir. 1944);
Wilson Bros. & Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F. (2d) 606 (9th Cir. 1941); James
F. X. O'Brien, P-H 1945 TC MEm. DEc. ff 45,069 (1945).
93 Harry P. Dilkes, P-H 1950 TC MEm. D c. ff 50,157 (1950) (accountant's accidental omission of 10 percent of business income from returns did not
justify negligence penalty).
94 Claire L. Canfield, 7 T. C. 135 (rebates found in an account entitled "reserves" and included in the return of income held to be a clerical error), rev'd
on other grounds sub. norm. Canfield v. Commissioner, 168 F. (2d) 907 (8th
Cir. 1946).
95 A. M. Standish, 4 T. C. 995 (1945), aff'd sub. nom. Standish v. Commissioner, 154 F. (2d) 1022 (9th Cir. 1946) (whether or not a certain trust violated
the rule against perpetuities).
96 Charlotte L. Andrews, 46 B. T. A. 607 (1942) (failure of taxpayer to include certain interest bearing script received in lieu of accrued interest on other
obligations held by her), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F. (2d) 314 (1943).
97 C. B. Wilcox, 27 B. T. A. 580 (1933) (failure to -report $50,000 income
upon the mistaken belief that it was a gift).
98 Bertha Kirkpatrick, P-H 1944 TC Mxm. Dxc. ff 44,403 (1944).
99 Gouldman v. Commissioner, 165 F. (2d) 686 (4th Cir. 1948) (profits unreported from sale of lots, and value of property received in part payment for
sale of interest in business not included in computing profit on sale); Oscar G.
Joseph, 32 B. T. A. 1192 (1935) (failure to report stock profit said to have
been mistakenly reported on wife's return); Thomas J. Avery, 11 B. T. A. 958
(1928) (real estate transactions that taxpayer claimed did not result in taxable
gain were omitted).
100 Roy A. Fellows et al., P-H 1950 TC MEm. DEc. f[ 50,014 (1950) (failure to keep proper records); Fred Zeller et al., P-H 1950 TC MEM. DEC.
50,010 (1950); W. R. Davis, P-H 1948 TC Mxa. Dxc. ff 48,089 (1948).
101 John T. Scurlock, P-H 1950 TC MEm. DEc. ff 50,009 (1950); Mildred
P. Rensler et al., P-H 1950 TC MEm. DEc. 1 50,008 (1950); Lambert F. Richtig
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Generally, ignorance and negligence are distinguished. While "ignorance of the law is not an excuse for wrongful acts ...it is distinguishable from negligence ....,,102 But negligence, rather than ignorance,
has been found despite the fact that the taxpayer was a widow with
little formal education, and with no business experience.' 0 3
The negligence penalty does not attach if the taxpayer makes full
disclosure of all the pertinent facts.10 4 It has been held that no negligence is present where there is sufficient information contained in the
return to apprise the Commissioner of an omission. 10 5
V.
Policy and Procedureof the Bureau
By way of Bureau policy and statutory provision the Government
enables a taxpayer to escape some or all of the penalties imposed by
law. The first of these methods is voluntary disclosure. If the taxpayer freely and willingly admits to the Government that he is guilty
of fraud, usually there will be a recommendation by the Bureau not
to prosecute. The disclosure must be made to some responsible official
of the Treasury Department before an investigation of the matter has
commenced. An investigation has commenced when an agent or deputy
collector is assigned to examine a particular return, or when the return has been questioned by an examining officer; it probably begins
when a "jacket" against a taxpayer is opened in the Intelligence
Unit.' 0 6 It follows that a voluntary disclosure made after an investigation has begun is of no avail to the taxpayer.' 0 7 However, a taxpayer
was recently allowed immunity from criminal prosecution upon his voluntary disclosure of fraud when he was yet ignorant of the fact that
an investigation had begun.' 08
et al., P-H 1950 TC Mmr. DEc. IT 50,001 (1950); John Sito et al., P-H 1949
TC Maa. DEc. IT49,300 (1949).
102 Bennett et ux. v. Commissioner, 139 F. (2d) 961, 967 (8th Cir. 1944).
103 Lena M. Buchwach, P-H 1950 TC MEm. DaEc. ff 50,229 (1950). The tax
court found as a fact that taxpayer was aware of her duty to keep adequate
records. See also Lottie Lobello Clayton, P-H 1948 TC MEm. DEc. R 48,112
(1948).
104
1922: A. R. R. 1167, 2 Cum. Burz. 211 (1922); Davis Regulator Co.,
36 B. T. A. 437 (1937).
105 Pullman, Inc., 8 T. C. 292 (1947).
106 United States v. McCormick, 67 F. (2d) 867 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied,
291 U. S. 662, 54 S. Ct. 438, 78 L. Ed. 1054 (1934).
107 United States v. Weisman, 78 F. Supp. 979 (D. Mass. 1948).
108 In re Liebster, 91 F. Supp. 814 (E. D. Pa. 1950). Upon petition by the
taxpayer, the court perinitted evidence given to a special agent, influenced by a
promise of immunity, to be suppressed as a violation of the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution.

NOTES
While a timely, repentant evader escapes criminal prosecution,10 9
the Treasury Department will relentlessly levy all other penalties."10
This is in keeping with the Bureau's policy of collecting its just due;
its patronly forgiveness of the crime is to encourage the evader to
pay. The reason for this policy is best explained by the statement:"'
In excusing the man from criminal prosecution, we are merely taking
a sensible step to produce the revenue called for by law with the minimum
cost of investigation.

It must be emphasized that a voluntary disclosure is only a policy of
the Treasury Department. It cannot be said that it bars, as a matter
of law, a subsequent criminal prosecution.' 1 2
The other policy of the Treasury Department authorized by Congress is the "compromise." 113 This provision permits, but does not
require, a compromise to be made of any civil or criminal case arising
under the internal revenue laws. Before a case is presented to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense, the Commissioner, with
the approval of the Secretary, Under Secretary, or Assistant Secretary
of Treasury, may effect a compromise. After it has been referred
to the Department of Justice, however, the authority is within the
discretion of the Attorney General only. To be binding there must
be a strict compliance with the statute;"1 4 informal agreements, promises of agents, or arrangements with agents or collectors, do not constitute such compliance."15 This, too, is only a policy. There is no
statutory compulsion on the Treasury Department to accept any compromise of either criminal or civil penalties. But through it, both
Government and taxpayer are spared the expense of inconvenience of
litigating sharply contested issues of law or fact involving "fraud,"
"intent," "wilfulness," and others.
The Intelligence Unit of the Treasury Department, with regional
units throughout the country, is in charge of investigating tax fraud.
A special agent of the regional office, together with an internal revenue
agent, will carry on the investigation of the particular case. If he
concludes prosecution should be undertaken, that fact is reported to
109

(1947).

Wenchel, Tax Frauds and Voluntary Disclosures, 25 TAXES 485, 488

See Garden City Feeder Co., 27 B. T. A. 1132 (1933).
Wenchel, supra note 109, at 488.
For a full discussion see Frazier, Is a Voluntary Disclosure a Legal Defense to a Criminal Prosecution?,28 TAXES 1071 (1950).
"13 INT. Rxv. CODE § 3761(a).
The Code gives only the power to "compromise any civil or criminal case arising out of the internal revenue laws."
114 INT. REv. CoDa § 3761(a); Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278
U. S. 282, 49 S. Ct. 129, 73 L. Ed. 379 (1928); United States v. Lustig et al., 67
F. Supp. 306 (S. D. N. Y. 1946), aft'd, 163 F. (2d) 85 (2d Cir. 1947).
15 INT. R . CODE § 3761(a); Hughson v. United States, 59 F. (2d) 17
(9th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 630, 53 S. Ct. 82, 77 L. Ed 546 (1932).
110
111
112
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the Special Agent in Charge of the regional office, upon whose approval
and recommendation the case is forwarded to the Chief of the Intelligence Unit, and then to the Penal Division of the Chief Counsel's
Office in the Bureau, where an attorney is assigned to the case. At
this point the taxpayer is given a chance to confer. If the case is
considered a proper one for prosecution, a statement or report is prepared for consideration by the head of the Penal Division, Chief Counsel of the Bureau, and the Commissioner. Upon their recommendation the entire file is transmitted to the Tax Division of the Department of Justice where the Assistant Attorney General in Charge will
examine the case and make a recommendation. This is reviewed by
the head of the Criminal Section of the Tax Division, by the Principal
Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General and finally by the Assistant
Attorney General himself. The taxpayer is again given an opportunity
to confer or submit additional information to the Department of Justice. If it is decided to prosecute, an indictment is drawn and the case
is submitted to the appropriate United States attorney. Regardless
of whether or not prosecution is rejected, the case is returned to the
local office for determination of civil penalties and deficiencies, at which
time a compromise may be effected. 116
Conclusion
Extensive interpretation of the penalty provisions of the Code has,
in a practical sense, added little to its clarification. Undoubtedly, Congress intended to create a distinction between a misdemeanor and a
felony under the criminal penalty provision, but it is difficult to visualize a situation which constitutes a misdemeanor that could not be
called a felony. An ingenious distinction between the two was made
in the Spies case, 117 where the Court spoke of "wilful but passive
neglect" and "wilful and positive attempt to evade"-the former being a misdemeanor, the two combined a felony. But the statutory
provision for felonies speaks of any wilful attempt to evade the tax.
For practical purposes, what manner of "wilful omission" (the misdemeanor rule) is not a deliberate attempt to evade the tax? Nevertheless, the distinguishing phraseology of the criminal fraud section exists,
and if a taxpayer wilfully fails to file a return, he will be guilty of a
misdemeanor. But if he wilfully files a false or fraudulent return, he
will be guilty of a felony.
For a fraudulent act to be penalized criminally, it must be "wilful";
for it to be penalized civilly, there must be "intent to evade." How
116 Much of the above discussion has been gleaned from the following
sources:

Rothwocks, Criminal Tax Prosecutions, 1 THE

AmERICAN

UNIVERSIY

TAX INsTITUTE LECTURES 269 (1948); SuRREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INcommr
ATION: CASES AND MATERIALs 48
117 Spies v. United States,

(1943).

TAx-

(1950).
317 U. S. 492, 499, 63 S. Ct. 364, 87 L. Ed. 418

